



Review

Silenced by fear: The nature, sources, and consequences of fear at work

Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart^{a,*}, James R. Detert^{b,1}, Linda Klebe Treviño^{a,2},
Amy C. Edmondson^{c,3}

^a*The Pennsylvania State University, United States*

^b*Cornell University, United States*

^c*Harvard University, United States*

Available online 12 August 2009

Abstract

In every organization, individual members have the potential to speak up about important issues, but a growing body of research suggests that they often remain silent instead, out of fear of negative personal and professional consequences. In this chapter, we draw on research from disciplines ranging from evolutionary psychology to neuroscience, sociology, and anthropology to unpack fear as a discrete emotion and to elucidate its effects on workplace silence. In doing so, we move beyond prior descriptions and categorizations of *what* employees fear to present a deeper understanding of the nature of fear experiences, where such fears originate, and the different types of employee silence they motivate. Our aim is to introduce new directions for future research on silence as well as to encourage further attention to the powerful and pervasive role of fear across numerous areas of theory and research on organizational behavior.

© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Silence in organizations	165
1.1. Current understanding of fear and silence in organizations	167
1.2. Expanding our understanding of fear and silence	167
2. Fear and workplace silence	168
2.1. Threat processing	168
2.2. Fear intensity	169
2.3. Responses to fear of speaking up	170
2.3.1. Non-deliberative defensive silence	171
2.3.2. Schema-driven defensive silence	171
2.3.3. Deliberative defensive silence	172
2.3.4. Habituated silence	172

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 814 278 8579.

E-mail addresses: jjg303@psu.edu (J.J. Kish-Gephart), jdetert@cornell.edu (J.R. Detert), ltrevino@psu.edu (L.K. Treviño), aedmondson@hbs.edu (A.C. Edmondson).

¹ Tel.: +1 607 255 2501.

² Tel.: +1 814 865 2194.

³ Tel.: +1 617 495 6732.

3.	Origins of fear-based silence	173
3.1.	Evolutionary origins of fear	173
3.1.1.	Challenging authority as a prepared fear	173
3.1.2.	Prepared fear and workplace silence	174
3.2.	Learned origins of fear	176
3.2.1.	Childhood socialization	177
3.2.2.	Institutional socialization	178
3.2.3.	Cultural socialization	179
3.3.	Summary	179
4.	Overcoming fear-based silence	179
4.1.	Anger	180
4.1.1.	Anger and fear-based silence	180
4.1.2.	Anger on behalf of others	182
4.1.3.	A note on anger displays	182
4.2.	Voice efficacy	182
4.2.1.	Developing voice efficacy	183
4.2.2.	The motivation to develop voice efficacy	184
5.	Discussion	185
5.1.	Research implications and opportunities	185
5.2.	Conclusion	187
	Acknowledgement	187
	References	187

“If any human emotion is as old as our species it must, surely, be fear, and the end of its hold on us is not in sight.” (Scruton, 1986: 7)

Fear is a powerful emotion that shapes many aspects of our lives. Nearly every day, we are bombarded by news media, television shows, movies, commercials, billboards, books, and magazines with new reasons to fear for our physical and psychological well-being. Some have even argued that we exist in a “culture of fear” (e.g., Furedi, 2002, 2006; Glassner, 1999; Shlapentokh, 2006; Stearns & Haggerty, 1991) studded with warnings about terrorism, international conflict, weakening economies, global warming, crime, infectious disease, and other types of threats that sell consumer products and presidential candidates. Although this may seem a pessimistic view of society, it speaks to the pervasiveness of fear in human life. As the opening quote by anthropologist David Scruton suggests, fear has shaped human behavior for a long time – and continues to do so today, even in the workplace.

Attention to fear in organizational life – what it is, how and why it is experienced, and to what effects – has not kept pace with the broader “affective revolution” in organizational behavior (Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003; see also Brief & Weiss, 2002 for a review). According to Grandey (2008), the rate of growth of emotions-related publications between 2002 and 2006 exceeded that of other more mainstream organizational behavior topics such as stress and job satisfaction. While emotions research began with an emphasis on trait affect and mood, recent years have seen a shift toward theory and empirical research related to discrete emotions such as anger (e.g., Geddes & Callister, 2007; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), envy (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007), and happiness (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). Largely absent from this list is fear. For example, a search of the ABI/Inform database for workplace-related research on the topic of emotion revealed 585 hits while a search on fear revealed only 15 hits.⁴ These search results are surprising given the potentially far-reaching impact of fear on workplace behavior. As a powerful, evolutionary-based emotion, fear encourages avoidance behavior, a narrowed perceptual and cognitive focus on perceived threats, and pessimistic judgments about risks and future outcomes (Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1993; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Maner and Gerend, 2007; Rachman, 1990). Given these manifestations, fear may influence a wide array of organizational phenomena, including decisions to reveal invisible diversity (Ragins, Singh, & Cornwell, 2007), reward and punishment distribution (Appelbaum, Bregman, & Moroz, 1998), team member/leader interaction, communication, and improvement activity (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006).

⁴ Search was conducted on ABI/Inform searching for the term “emotion” as a subject and “workplace” or “organization*” in the citation/abstract (see also Grandey, 2008). This was similarly done for the search on “fear.”

One specific example of the relevance of fear in organizational studies – and the primary focus of this chapter – is fear’s role in employee silence. Increasingly, organizations rely on employees at all levels to contribute their ideas and observations – not just their time and physical energy – to the well-being of the collective enterprise. Researchers, however, find that employees frequently remain silent in moments that call for voice, whether about matters relating to employee treatment (Bowen & Blackmon, 2003; Cortina & Magley, 2003; Creed, 2003), managerial behavior (Milliken et al., 2003), patient care (Edmondson, 2003), organizational functioning and performance (Ashford, 1998; Detert & Treviño, *in press*; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003), or the outbreak and spread of corporate scandal (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008). We, along with others, have documented withholding of relevant knowledge affecting patient care decisions (e.g., Chiang & Pepper, 2006; Edmondson, 1996, 2003), improvement suggestions for marketing, manufacturing, and R&D (Detert & Treviño, *in press*; Milliken et al., 2003), and information about illegal and unethical behaviors (Treviño & Victor, 1992; Treviño, Weaver, Gibson, & Toffler, 1999; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990), all of which suggest that contemporary organizations face considerable counterproductive silence.

Regardless of the content of desired upward communication, a common theme pervades explanations for its withholding: fear (e.g., Burris, 2005; Chiang & Pepper, 2006; Cortina & Magley, 2003; Detert & Treviño, *in press*; Dutton, Ashford, Lawrence, & Miner-Rubino, 2002; Edmondson, 1996; Graham, 1986; Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Henik, 2008; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Milliken et al., 2003; Ryan & Oestreich, 1991; Sprague & Ruud, 1988). For example, Ryan and Oestrich (1998: 6) reported that “at least 70% of the 260 people we interviewed said that they had hesitated to speak up because they feared some type of repercussion.” Likewise, 85% of Milliken et al.’s (2003) interview subjects said that “on at least one occasion, they had felt unable to raise an issue or concern to their bosses even though they felt the issue was important.” And, approximately 50% of over 40,000 survey respondents in a high tech company studied by Detert (2003) did not agree that it was “safe to speak up” at work. Respondents across these studies reported fear of experiencing unwanted social or material consequences for saying something that might anger or disappoint others.

Despite the growing consensus about fear as an important driver of silence in organizations, and despite agreement on what employees report fearing as a consequence of speaking up, much remains to be explained about the causes, experience, and outcomes of fear in voice situations. For example, extant literature generally treats all fear experiences as equivalent, namely, as a recognized emotion that alters one’s conscious deliberation of stimulus cues and the desirable response. Yet the fear experienced when unexpectedly feeling the need to speak in a given moment during a meeting – or else forgo the chance forever – is likely different from the fear experienced when considering speaking up privately or over an extended timeframe. Current literature also presents most sources of fear of speaking up at work as quite proximate (e.g., one’s current boss or organizational climate), even though general orientations toward interacting with authorities – including whether and when to be fearful – develop and are reinforced beginning early in life. In this chapter, therefore, we move beyond descriptions and categorizations of *what* employees’ fear to present a deeper understanding of the nature and types of fear experiences, a broader picture of where such fears originate, and a new articulation of the different types of silence they motivate. In doing so, we begin to address the area’s “significant omission” of emotion – in particular, fear – despite it being “fundamental to understanding the whole process” of silence in organizational life (Blenkinsopp & Edwards, 2008: 187). Our undertaking is important not only for advancing theory and research but also practically, because refined understanding of the sources, nature, and manifestations of fear of speaking up is needed to guide those in power who seek to improve their organizations via routine upward input from employees at all levels.

In what follows, we begin by placing this chapter in the context of prior silence literature. Then, drawing from a broad range of literatures – including anthropology, social psychology, evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and sociology – we investigate what is known about fear and elucidate *how* fear in its various forms influences silence. In the process, we also demonstrate *why* fear of speaking to authority is so pervasive in organizations. Specifically, we help reveal the origins of fear-based silence and its short- and long-term effects on human psychology and behavior in workplaces, by tracing its deep roots in human evolution and basic human learning experiences. Finally, we conclude the paper by suggesting two potential countervailing forces to fear’s silencing effects – one based on another basic emotion (anger) and a second based on learning (voice efficacy).

1. Silence in organizations

Employee silence is defined here as the withholding of ideas, suggestions, or concerns about people, products, or processes that might have been communicated verbally to someone inside the organization with the perceived

authority to act. Silence is thus foregoing opportunities for “challenging organizational citizenship behavior” (Van Dyne, Cummings, & McLean Parks, 1995). Though silence can be driven by multiple motives (Milliken et al., 2003; Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003), we focus here on silence driven by fear. Before offering a brief review of the silence literature, we further clarify the focus and underlying assumptions of this chapter.

First, consistent with prior theorizing (Pinder & Harlos, 2001; Van Dyne et al., 2003), we agree that silence is not simply the conceptual opposite of voice, a term with several meanings of its own in the literature (e.g., a discretionary proactive behavior through which employees challenge the status quo by offering constructive suggestions for change ([Hirschman, 1970; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998], a formal opportunity provided by organizations to enhance procedural justice perceptions [Brockner et al., 1998]). Across definitions, voice is treated as deliberative and generally prosocial (e.g., Ashford, Sutcliffe, & Christianson, 2009; Chiaburu, Marinova, & Van Dyne, 2008). One form of silence is similarly deliberative (but self-focused rather than prosocial) such as when employees decide to conceal problems, keep bad news to themselves, or refrain from offering feedback because of the perceived personal risks of speaking up. However, we will argue that much employee silence is not highly deliberative. Silence can, and often does, result from automatic processes that are quite different from the intentional, conscious processes generally described in the literature as preceding voice. Further, distinguishing silence from voice conceptually is important because their antecedents may differ. For example, proactive personality may be a positive predictor of voice yet be relatively unrelated to silence because proactive individuals may notice more things to speak up about (and therefore do so more frequently) but still choose silence frequently (due to fear or other causes).

Second, we focus on understanding a particular type of workplace silence. Rather than focusing on silence that stems from having nothing to say (i.e., from acceptance of the status quo, disengagement or resignation) or from prosocial concern for the well-being of others (Milliken & Morrison, 2003), we examine “defensive” (Van Dyne et al., 2003) or “quiescent” (Pinder & Harlos, 2001) silence – that is, the withholding of verbal comments because one anticipates negative consequences for the self.

Third, we examine silence where the intended or logical target for one’s comments is an internal authority figure – someone higher in the organization’s formal chain of command. Individuals also can withhold information or ideas from peers, subordinates, or even outsiders (as in decisions about whether to blow the whistle), but we believe the reasons for silence to different targets may be sufficiently different to warrant separate attention. For example, concerns about social consequences (e.g., looking foolish, being isolated) loom large in silence amongst peers (Milliken et al., 2003) while concerns about career consequences (e.g., lost opportunities for promotion, compensation, getting fired) may be a more salient driver of silence for voice targeted at someone with formal power in the organization’s hierarchy (Ryan & Oestreich, 1991).

Fourth, we consider silence across the broad spectrum of issues that employees might speak up about at work, ranging from concerns about personal or interpersonal treatment to problems or ideas for core work processes or products to those involving ethical or legal concerns. While acknowledging the importance of foregone whistleblowing (i.e., silence related to illegal, immoral or illegitimate actions; see Miceli et al., 2008 for a review) and self-censure about matters of principle (e.g., significant violations of human rights or procedural justice; Graham, 1986; Pinder & Harlos, 2001), this chapter focuses mostly on silence about the more routine or mundane work-related issues and observations of employees (Detert & Burris, 2007; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Silence about things experienced regularly by employees at all levels, such as recognition of waste and inefficiencies, ideas about products, and suggestions for process improvement (Milliken et al., 2003; Ryan & Oestreich, 1991), is of particular theoretical interest because it is less intuitively clear why people should fear speaking up to authorities who clearly have a stake in knowing about and acting on such issues.

We suggest that silence toward authorities occurs regularly for content that subordinates consider within the scope of a target authority’s decision rights. Except on the rare occasions that call for external whistleblowing or principled dissent to very senior leaders, we assume that most employees accept the legal-rational, legitimate authority of higher-ups (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Weber, 1947), including the latter’s right to punish and reward and to make final decisions (French & Raven, 1959; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). That is, within employees’ often broad “zone of indifference” (Barnard, 1938), speaking up or staying silent refers to attempts to spur an authority to address a work problem or issue, not to the questioning or undermining of authority. We recognize, of course, that sometimes subordinates don’t speak because they assume that authorities have superior knowledge or the right to operate without question based on their position, or because subordinates do not even think about offering ideas or questions. In short, wanting to speak up about day-to-day problems and improvement possibilities does not generally imply a desire to overthrow authority systems, and deferential silence or obedience to authority need not necessarily involve fear.

Finally, our view of silence refers to the absence of direct verbal communication, not to the failure to do other things that convey dissatisfaction with or initiate attempted improvements in some aspect of organizational functioning. For example, a failure to stay informed about important issues, not writing memos or proposals about ideas, or not filing formal grievances or reports using internal or external channels – all things that have at times been included as aspects of voice behavior (e.g., Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988) – are not within the scope of our conception of employee silence. Likewise, the withholding of verbal input is not presumed to be identical to the failure to take charge (Morrison & Phelps, 1999) or to undertake task revisions (Staw & Boettger, 1990).

1.1. *Current understanding of fear and silence in organizations*

The notion that “fear” is an important underlying reason for employee silence about all types of work issues has gained widespread traction in recent years (e.g., Chiang & Pepper, 2006; Cortina & Magley, 2003; Detert & Treviño, in press; Dutton et al., 2002; Edmondson, 2002; Graham, 1986; Gundlach, Douglas, et al., 2003; Henik, 2008; Milliken et al., 2003; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Sprague & Ruud, 1988). Milliken et al. (2003), for example, found that interviewees were afraid to speak up about a variety of day-to-day concerns because of the risks they perceived of negative labeling, retaliation, or loss of social capital. Others have likewise found that employee silence may be rooted in fears of basic existence or relatedness losses, such as job loss, lost promotion opportunities, or reputational harm (Detert, 2003; Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes, & Wierba, 1997; Ryan & Oestreich, 1991). In a similar vein, research linking lower levels of psychological safety with silence (e.g., Ashford, Rothband, Piderit, & Dutton, 1998; Edmondson, 2003; Harlos & Pinder, 2000) and higher levels of psychological safety with voice (e.g., Detert & Burris, 2007) also imply a central role for fear, because psychological safety describes a state of low interpersonal fear (Edmondson, 1999).

Drawing from Johannesen’s (1974) definition of employee silence as intentional withholding of information, the few explicit descriptions of fear-driven silence in the literature center on the importance of conscious recognition of the desire to speak up as well as the fear of doing so (e.g., Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008; Miceli et al., 2008). Quiescent silence (Pinder & Harlos, 2001), for example, refers to conscious, deliberate withholding of genuine expression; likewise, defensive silence (Van Dyne et al., 2003: 1367) is described as “intentional and proactive behavior. . . involving awareness and consideration of alternatives, followed by a conscious decision to withhold ideas” based, in part, on recognized fear of consequences. In these definitions of silence, would-be speakers are aware of their fear, consider the alternatives, and make a conscious decision to withhold relevant input. Nearly all research to date also treats employee silence as a largely conscious choice that represents the outcome of an expectancy-like mental calculus (e.g., Dutton et al., 1997; Milliken et al., 2003; Premeaux & Bedeian, 2003). Employees have something to say, but conclude after considering the estimated costs and benefits of doing so that they should not. In these models, fear’s role is to tip the cognitive scale toward silence. For example, employees contemplating issue selling are described as consciously recognizing and weighing aspects of the issue or the environment that trigger fears of image risk, which in turn tilts the calculus toward silence (Ashford et al., 1998). Likewise, potential whistleblowers are described as engaging in an “ongoing process of sensemaking” (Blenkinsopp & Edwards, 2008: 191), preceding step-by-step through sequences depicted as decision trees (Gundlach, Douglas, et al., 2003; Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2003; Miceli et al., 2008).

1.2. *Expanding our understanding of fear and silence*

In this chapter, we expand understanding of fear’s role in employee silence by clarifying how employee fear reactions differ in intensity across situations depending upon the level of perceived threat. We then propose that while lower intensity fear sometimes leads to deliberative defensive silence (as described in the current literature; e.g., Pinder & Harlos, 2001; Van Dyne et al., 2003), the degree to which such decisions are carefully considered (rather than schema-driven) varies based on both the fear intensity and the time-frame for choosing a response. We argue that silence driven by higher intensity fear should be conceptualized as a more automatic response that neither requires, nor often involves, conscious recognition of alternatives or weighing of costs and benefits. Finally, we propose that repeated episodes of fear-driven silence can eventually lead to “habituated silence” that may resemble resignation or acquiescence but is actually a manifestation of fear’s long shadow at work.

This chapter also advances understanding of the *evolutionary and learned origins* of fear of speaking up at work that drive the intensity of fear experienced by employees. With a few exceptions, extant literature on employee silence

describes fear as the result of current or proximate organizational stimuli. For example, Dutton and colleagues' description of what managers attend to in "reading the wind" of context favorability for issue selling includes factors such as current top management's perceived openness and willingness to listen; the perceived safety, supportiveness, and conservativeness of the current organizational culture; and current competitive position of the company (Dutton et al., 1997, 2002). Likewise, fear of speaking up to one's current boss is described primarily as a function of the boss's behavior or style (Ashford et al., 1998; Milliken et al., 2003; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005), the current organization's structural features (e.g., centralized decision-making, lack of formal input mechanisms – Milliken et al., 2003; Morrison & Milliken, 2000), the organization's climate (e.g., general silence climate within the organization – Morrison & Milliken, 2000; internal procedural justice climate – Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008), or insecurity about one's job or job mobility (Dutton et al., 1997; Withey & Cooper, 1989). We expand this picture by proposing that the fear of speaking up at work – to one's current boss in one's current organization – has much broader and more distal roots. Specifically, we draw from a range of research and theory in multiple disciplines to build and illustrate an argument that current fears of challenging authority stem from two fundamental sources: (1) humans' evolutionary heritage that prepared us to readily learn to be vigilant and self-protective around higher-status others; and (2) experiences beginning very early in life and extending across nearly every life domain that create enduring schemas that intensify the effects of humans' evolutionary preparedness. Indeed, the effect of these deeply rooted and diffuse factors in potential voice situations is a primary reason that we challenge the idea that fear-based silence is usually, or even often, based on an accurate, highly deliberative assessment of current risks.

2. Fear and workplace silence

Anyone who has experienced fear – from startle at the sight of a spider to fear of the shadowed dangers in a dark alley – can easily recall how this powerful, unpleasant emotion overwhelms one's feelings, thoughts, and behaviors (Kreitler, 2004). Fear is often accompanied by feelings of apprehension, foreboding, and helplessness (Rachman, 1990), and represents the body's natural protection against potential threat – whether physical or psychological (Dozier, 1998; MacDonald, Kingsbury, & Shaw, 2005). As a primary discrete emotion (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Ohman & Wiens, 2001; see Plutchik, 2003 for a review), fear can be differentiated from related moods by its need for a specific triggering target and its comparatively shorter duration (Forgas & East, 2008; Grandey, 2008; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). However, simply identifying fear as a discrete emotion does little to elucidate its negative, pervasive, and multi-dimensional nature. In this section, therefore, we unpack the characteristics of fear to better understand how this powerful emotion is triggered and processed in the workplace. We then examine how varying intensities of fear may interact with time available for choosing a response to produce four qualitatively different types of silence.

2.1. Threat processing

We begin by describing how the processing of cues in one's environment triggers a fear reaction. According to evolutionary psychology, emotions exist to solve "different adaptive problem[s] that arose during hominid evolutionary history" (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000: 91). Fear, in particular, evolved to protect humans against threats to survival; and its evolutionary-based effects continue to influence modern humans despite the changed nature of the threats we face (Dozier, 1998; Ohman, 2008). More specifically, Ohman and Mineka (2001: 484) argued that individuals are equipped with a *fear module*, or a mental adaptation "specifically tailored to help solve adaptive problems promoted by potentially life-threatening situations in the ecology of our distant forefathers" (see also Tooby & Cosmides, 1995). Because prehistoric individuals could be fatally harmed if they did not react quickly, a premium was placed on early detection and immediate reaction to a potential threat. The fear module – pre-dating other brain modules, including higher cognitive functions – is thus on constant patrol for threat cues (LeDoux, 1996; Ohman, 1993). When cues in one's environment signal an immediate severe threat, the fear module can quickly and non-consciously trigger a fear reaction (Ohman, 2000, 2008; Ohman & Mineka, 2001).

Recent neuroscience research supports this perspective by identifying two neural pathways in the brain: the "low road" and the "high road" (see LeDoux, 1996 for a review). In contrast to the slower and more accurate high road, the low road represents a direct pathway from the thalamus to the amygdala for fast, automatic, non-conscious processing of threat cues. When the sensory information on the "quick and dirty" low road signals a potential threat, the amygdala begins to automatically prepare the human body to respond – even if this response is determined later to be an

overreaction to a false positive. In this way, the fear module operates under a “better safe than sorry” mentality: from a survival perspective, an organism was better off overreacting to a false positive than failing to react to a false negative. Moreover, because of its roots in evolution, the fear module is especially reactive (via the low road) to certain threat cues that are related to prehistoric human survival (e.g., “prepared fears” such as dangerous animals; cues of rapid approach, loud noise, or novelty). As we argue below, fear of challenging authority may be one such evolutionary-based fear.

Fear can also be triggered without conscious awareness based on a conditioned or “associative” response (Power & Dalgleish, 2008; Smith & Kirby, 2001). More specifically, multiple and traumatic past experiences with a particular situation or stimulus can develop into an automatic fear association based on cues from those past experiences. For example, an individual who faced a verbally abusive father in childhood may experience an automatic fear reaction in response to an angry authority figure later in life. As we discuss below (see “Origins of Fear-based Silence”), past distal experiences from outside the workplace carry over and influence present-day interactions with organizational authority figures. Additionally, we speculate that severe traumatic experiences with a workplace authority, such as with an abusive supervisor (Tepper, 2000), might also create this type of associative reaction.

In addition to an associative response, cognitive appraisal theorists argue that discrete emotions involve a distinct combination of primary and secondary appraisals (Roseman & Smith, 2001; Scherer, 2000).⁵ These appraisals represent “the meaning that the person ascribes to the situation” (Grandey, 2008: 238) and can occur with or without conscious awareness (Power & Dalgleish, 2008; Roseman & Smith, 2001). However, unlike the associative response or the evolutionary-based low road, this process involves more elaborate cognition.

First, the primary appraisal involves an individual’s determination that the situation is counter to his or her well-being or goals. Accumulated prior experiences (direct and indirect) in long-term memory – that is, situation-relevant schemas or knowledge structures (e.g., Lord & Foti, 1986; Walsh, 1995) – are compared against the potential threat in the situation to determine “how the individual’s situation will change” given the possible outcomes (i.e., will an important goal be blocked?) (Power & Dalgleish, 2008: 148). Related to voice situations in the workplace specifically, employees arguably have two over-arching goals: (1) to provide for their family or themselves financially, and (2) to be accepted by others in their work environment (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Research, for example, suggests that employees develop schemas (through vicarious and direct experiences) about the negative consequences of speaking up to an authority figure – including loss of social capital, reputation, or promotion (Detert & Edmondson, 2008; Dutton et al., 1997, 2002; Morrison et al., 2003). These schemas imply that challenging authority will be perceived as counter to employees’ main work-related goals because of the anticipation of negative consequences.

Second, individuals will appraise the extent to which the outcome of the situation is uncertain or not under their control (secondary appraisal) (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Authorities, by their very nature, have power over the accumulation and distribution of important resources (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Sennett (1980: 18) suggested that humans have an “intuitive sense” of what authority is and of the power held by authority figures. In potential voice situations, then, employees will likely perceive that they risk punishment from the authority figure – even if this perception is not objectively true. The outcome of challenging authority is likely to be appraised as uncontrollable, thereby triggering a fear reaction (c.f., Morrison & Rothman, 2009). As considered further in the next section, the *intensity* of the fear experience is related to the degree of perceived uncontrollability (i.e., the threat is seen as greater when uncontrollability is higher).

2.2. *Fear intensity*

The processes described above help to elucidate how threats in one’s environment are evaluated by the brain. Such evaluations result in a higher or lower intensity fear response depending on two characteristics of the threat – specifically, what we refer to as *threat immediacy* and *threat severity* (Blanchard & Blanchard, 2008; Craske, 2003; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Muris, 2007). Threat immediacy reflects the amount of time an individual has to choose a response. Applied to voice situations, for example, employees may have a matter of seconds (e.g., the boss becomes confrontational in a meeting), minutes (e.g., the employee needs to speak up before the meeting is over), or days (e.g., the employee considers discussing an issue with the boss at an upcoming meeting) to choose whether to speak up or

⁵ Debate remains as to the exact process and types of appraisals, but researchers generally agree on the primary and secondary appraisals described here. See Roseman and Smith (2001) for a detailed review.




Fig. 1. Event-based model of fear intensity.

remain silent (c.f., Edwards, Ashkanasy, & Gardner, 2009). Threat severity can be defined as “the perceived amount of threat” in the situation (Gray & McNaughton, 2000: 6), and is a subjective perception. As depicted in Fig. 1, these perceptions result from the detection and comparison of current cues against innate and learned programming (described in detail below; see “Origins of Fear”). For example, an individual who has a bad prior experience with a boss will likely perceive upcoming related situations with that boss as high in threat severity.

We argue that perceptions of threat severity and threat immediacy in voice situations shape fear intensity. For example, an employee may begin to speak up at a meeting and then be suddenly confronted by a threatening and aggressive boss. In this case, two conditions are present: high threat immediacy and high threat severity, likely giving rise to *high intensity fear* (often described as terror or fright; TenHouton, 2007; Turner, 2000). In contrast, *low intensity fear*⁶ is elicited in situations where the threat is less severe and less immediate (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Lazarus & Averill, 1972). For example, an employee who knows about an upcoming staff meeting may experience a lower intensity fear when potentially threatening issues with his or her project are being planned for discussion. In this case, the threat is an anticipated one. Low intensity fear thus has been described as “anticipatory fear” (Plutchik, 2003: 315) or “diffuse fear” (Rachman, 2004: 2). All else being equal, we expect perceptions of higher threat severity and higher threat immediacy to be positively related to higher intensity fear (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Next, we link fear intensity to various types of workplace silence.

2.3. Responses to fear of speaking up

According to Frijda (1986: 72), fear can be defined by its withdrawal action tendency or “urge to separate oneself from aversive events.” When a threat is perceived, the brain automatically begins to send signals to the body to prepare for flight or removal from the dangerous situation; this is often accompanied by physiological preparation including increasing heart rate and blood pressure (to increase oxygen throughout the body), slowing digestion, and diverting blood into the muscles for a quick burst of energy (LeDoux, 1996; Ohman, 1993). Depending on the circumstances of the situation, however, flight can also manifest itself in various other behaviors including “avoidance, freezing (‘being paralyzed’), or otherwise increasing the distance or dissociation between oneself and the fright-evoking object” (Kreitler, 2004: 1; see also Ohman & Wiens, 2003). For example, high intensity fear – triggered by the perception of an immediate or severe threat – is likely to be accompanied by an automatic tendency to remove oneself from the threat via flight. In contrast, low intensity fear – for a less immediate or less severe threat – is likely to prompt increased attention, rumination, and cautious avoidance as the situation develops (Craske, 2003; deCatanzaro, 1998; Frijda, 1986).

Based on the general processes and behavioral outcomes associated with fear, we argue that silence as a conscious, highly deliberative, and calculative choice – or what has been called defensive silence (e.g., Van Dyne et al., 2003) – describes some but not all responses to potential voice situations. As elaborated below and shown in Fig. 2, crossing the level of fear intensity (low–high) with the amount of time one has to respond to a voice opportunity (short–long) leads to predictions of three distinct types of in-the-moment fear-based silence – with one type occurring in two cells. Subsequently, we propose an additional type of silence (habitual) that develops over time.

⁶ To avoid confusion with clinical forms of anxiety (see Blanchard & Blanchard, 2008; Rosen & Schulkin, 1998), we use the term *low intensity fear*.




Fig. 2. Predicted responses to the interaction of fear intensity and time available for response.

2.3.1. Non-deliberative defensive silence

Faced with high intensity fear, the human body's innate, automatic response is withdrawal or flight. The preferred type of withdrawal is removal from the danger completely (Ohman and Wiens, 2001), but withdrawal can also occur via freeze – “a preparatory to rapid escape when the coast clears” (LeDoux, 1996: 149; also Barlow, 2002; Dozier, 1998; Kreitler, 2004). We conceptualize *non-deliberative defensive silence* in the workplace as an automatic, non-conscious psychological retreat from a high threat severity voice situation that allows little time for a response (Fig. 2, upper left cell). For example, an employee might begin to speak up to a manager and find that the manager becomes unexpectedly angry and confrontational. The employee then may immediately experience high intensity fear and retreat quickly into non-deliberative defensive silence. In such situations, the silence can result from an immediate translation of low-road (e.g., amygdala-based) processing into the behavioral response (silence) with no need for conscious choice by the employee (LeDoux, 1996; c.f., Morrison & Rothman, 2009). Because literal flight in social situations (e.g., the employee runs out of the conference room) is counter-normative and may elicit its own fear and shame-related reactions, the employee's best option for avoiding harm to self may be to freeze. Whereas voice would bring the individual “closer” to the threat and potential harm, non-deliberative defensive silence (freezing) reduces the potential for harm from speaking up or from counter-normatively fleeing from the perceived threat (the authority figure in a meeting).

2.3.2. Schema-driven defensive silence

Voice situations can also elicit *schema-driven* processing. This involves reliance on a schema – that is, “a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991: 98) – to quickly determine the appropriate course of action. For schema-driven silence, we argue that employees can be consciously aware of their decision to remain silent but still not engage in decision-making that is deliberated, weighed, or tested for accuracy. We suggest that fear-based silence that is primarily schema-driven occurs in two types of situations.

The first is when an employee experiences high intensity fear in situations where there is time available for decision making (Fig. 2, upper right cell). For example, an employee may notice a serious flaw in a boss's favorite new project and consider whether to inform the boss at some future point. If the employee perceives the situation as highly threatening (because, for example, he has had a terrible experience with the boss' temper in the past or expects that a lucrative promotion might be lost), he is likely to make an instant decision to keep quiet (e.g., “No way I'm saying anything; it's dangerous!”). This quickly derived conclusion rests on the brain's effortless matching of the contemplated voice situation against schemas representing a lifetime of loosely related experiences (as we describe further in “Origins of Fear”). Decisions made through schema-based processing are often made with awareness and can have the appearance of being deliberative (especially when described post hoc), but in actuality are largely automatic (Gioia & Sims, 1986). Despite having time to reappraise the situation after the quick, schema-driven assessment, the “ineffable and unpleasant feeling” (Kreitler, 2004: 1) of intense fear reduces the motivation to do so. In short, the tendency to trust, rather than test, the conclusions of schema-based processing (Lord & Foti, 1986) makes simple, automatically evoked thoughts like “speaking up in a situation like this is futile” or “the boss doesn't want to hear from subordinates” a powerful force behind silence.

Schema-driven defensive silence also may occur in cases involving low intensity fear but a need for a quick response (Fig. 2, lower left cell). In general, low intensity fear leads to changes in perception, cognition, and behavior that include narrowing of attention on potential threats, increased scanning of the environment, rumination and vigilance, and overall cautious behavior (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; deCatanzaro, 1998; Rosen & Schulkin,

1998). Thus, rather than triggering an immediate flight or freeze response, low intensity fear prompts an individual to be on alert. Silence may then be chosen as the safer alternative to voice because voice situations requiring an immediate response preclude extended deliberation (including consulting others or gathering more information before choosing to speak up). For example, an employee might experience low intensity fear when recognizing in a meeting that he or she has a suggestion to make and, without time for deliberation, is likely to choose silence – implicitly recognizing the “better safe than sorry” nature of the decision. Here again, although the employee’s silence is intentional and reflects a conscious decision to remain silent, it is schema-driven rather than deliberative – that is, it relies on automatic cue matching of stimuli in the current situation to existing mental knowledge structures. In short, when voice situations leave little time for contemplating a response, individuals are likely to be guided by accumulated schemas.

2.3.3. *Deliberative defensive silence*

Similar to prior conceptualizations of fear-based silence (e.g., defensive silence [Van Dyne et al., 2003] and quiescent silence [Pinder & Harlos, 2001]), *deliberative defensive silence* represents an intentional and conscious choice to try to protect oneself in a potentially dangerous situation. We argue that deliberative defensive silence most likely occurs in voice situations with low fear intensity and ample time to choose a response (Fig. 2, lower right cell). For example, an employee might experience lower intensity fear when thinking about the prospect of going to his or her boss with suggestions for improvements to the hiring process. Here the individual has ample time (if desired) to deliberately and consciously weigh the costs and benefits, consult valued others, and consider alternate voice strategies. However, as described above, low intensity fear prompts the individual to be on alert – to experience elevated arousal and cognitive rumination, and to exhibit overall cautious behavior as the situation develops (Rachman, 2004). In addition, because “each emotion carries with it motivational properties that fuel carryover to subsequent judgments and decisions” (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006: 119), employee reconsideration of speaking up will likely be repeatedly shaped by fear’s naturally pessimistic and cautious lens, which emphasizes and exaggerates the risks of speaking up (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Maner & Gerend, 2007; Maner et al., 2005). Therefore, despite extended time for deliberation, we argue that an individual will be unlikely to alter his or her initial inclination toward deliberative defensive silence unless he or she is confronted with convincing contradictory evidence (e.g., a co-worker shares a strongly positive voice experience with the target; the individual has an extremely positive chance encounter with the target).

2.3.4. *Habituated silence*

The three types of silence proposed above are event-specific responses to fear – that is, outcomes of specific instances where the potential for speaking up to an authority is recognized, a fear response is triggered, and the result is silence (whether non-deliberative, schema-driven, or deliberative). Over the long-term, however, such individual episodic experiences may lead to what we term *habituated silence* (see also Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Morrison & Rothman, 2009). Habituated silence results from humans’ natural tendency to develop safety-oriented avoidance behaviors to reduce fear by minimizing exposure to threatening situations that might trigger fear (Dozier, 1998; Kreitler, 2004; Rachman, 1990). Over time, safety behaviors become highly ingrained and habituated because “substantial avoidance prevents individuals from ‘reality testing’” (Barlow, 2002: 236). For example, an individual who developed a fear of speaking honestly to his or her boss after a negative experience long ago is unlikely to test whether a threat still exists and whether behaviors such as avoiding any discussions that might lead to disagreement are still warranted. Learned helplessness theory (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman, 1975) also supports the idea that individuals develop and utilize passive behaviors after repeated exposure to feelings that one has no control over undesirable outcomes. A key aspect of habituated silence is the individual’s desire to avoid feeling out of control (and thus, experiencing fear).

Therefore, employees who have learned to tightly associate fear and negative outcomes with speaking up to authority may default to habituated silence without consciously experiencing fear and, in some cases, without even consciously registering situations as legitimate contexts for voice. When individuals have avoided considering speaking up for long enough, they no longer need the fear module to trigger feelings of apprehension or uncertainty to choose silence. In such cases, silence that appears to be a form of resignation or acquiescence may actually be silence as a default – an unrecognized voice opportunity that nonconsciously protects the self and avoids stirring up feelings of fear.

3. Origins of fear-based silence

In the previous section, we described the differential intensity of fear triggered by threat cues associated with different types of potential voice situations. In this section, we examine the types and origins of cues that signal threat in the first place. To develop a broader understanding of the reasons why individuals fear speaking up to authority, we explore the more distal evolutionary and learned origins of this fear. As reviewed below, fear of challenging authority has long been a characteristic of basic human nature, evolved from millions of years of human existence and survival in social environments. Building on this work, we outline the myriad ways that individuals in current times internalize – through both direct and vicarious learning – the message that challenging authority is often unacceptable and potentially dangerous.

3.1. Evolutionary origins of fear

Pop culture is filled with allusions to humans' primal fears: "I hate snakes," states movie character Indiana Jones as he descends into an archaeological dig site crawling with hundreds of snakes. Contestants on the television show *Fear Factor* squirm as snakes, spiders, and insects are poured over their bodies. Although few human beings experience such situations, most would agree on a common repulsion that causes hearts to race and skin to crawl. According to evolutionary psychology, certain human fears have their basis in prehistoric survival needs. These fears (e.g., snakes, spiders) are examples of *prepared fears* (Seligman, 1971) – fears related to recurrent threats to human survival in the evolutionary past (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Other prepared fears include heights, wide-open spaces, enclosed spaces, ostracism, and the dark (Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Williams, 2001). Because of their evolutionary basis, prepared fears are especially potent and resilient. Research demonstrates that individuals are more easily conditioned to learn prepared fears than non-evolutionary based ones (see Mineka & Sutton, 2006 for a detailed review). In addition, prepared fears are "stickier" than non-evolutionary fears; that is, once learned, they are difficult to extinguish (LeDoux, 1996; Mineka & Sutton, 2006). As stated by Saul (2002: 45), "We have modern and sophisticated lives but the deep recesses of our mind have developed to react to long-gone situations."

3.1.1. Challenging authority as a prepared fear

Fear of challenging an authority (or any higher-status group member) may be an evolutionary-based fear, helping to explain its apparent potency in influencing employee behavior. In evolutionary times, individuals with high status were conferred with significant advantages, including access to desirable mates, food, and other resources (Cummins, 2005; de Waal, 2005; Kenrick, Maner, & Li, 2005; Ohman, Dimberg, & Ost, 1985; Sapolsky, 2005). In addition, high status group members often had the physical prowess and powerful alliances to punish those who threatened their position, including killing an opponent, inflicting serious injury, or ruining another's social reputation (a form of ostracism) (Duntley, 2005; Kerr & Levine, 2008). According to dominance theory (Archer, 1988), low status members are unlikely to challenge high status members for resources. For the low status member, a confrontation with a high status member could end in death or loss of reproductive fitness. At the same time, for the high status member, a confrontation – though likely won – uses up precious resources and energy that may create vulnerability to later attacks. Over time, dealing with these types of circumstances may have endowed humans with an evolutionary-based "motivational system designed to regulate willingness to take competitive risks in dominance-relevant contexts" (Ermer, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2008: 107). Indeed, researchers widely view status ranking as a fundamental human motive, traceable to our primate lineage (Erdal & Whiten, 1994; Kellerman, 2008; Kenrick, Maner, & Li, 2005; Knauft, 1994). Similarly, Milgram (1974: 125) argued that obedience to higher-status others "was bred into the [human] organism through the extended operation of evolutionary processes."

Similar to other evolutionary-based fears, fear of challenging a higher status member is likely a prepared fear. Over time, "mutations causing innate recognition and avoidance of such stimuli must have arisen" (deCatanzaro, 1998: 129), because those able to recognize and respond appropriately to status conflict situations had a higher chance of reproductive success. While today's modern environment is not as physically dangerous as that of early humans, offending those with higher status may continue to evoke fear because of the potential for social harm (Ermer et al., 2008; Pinker, 1997). For example, Hankiss (2001: 35–36) suggested that social harm can be viewed as threatening one's very existence:

The ultimate source of fear is undoubtedly the potential destruction of our lives. In the social sciences, however, the concept of life cannot and should not be reduced to mean plain biological life. It is human existence taken in

its broadest sense. It is human life in its wholeness and freedom, dignity and meaning. Our existence, defined in this way, is threatened even in the trivial accidents of everyday life. If one is humiliated, or if one fails to do something, one's self-esteem, that is, one's existence as a person, is impaired. If one loses one's job, it is not only one's physical existence that is threatened, but also one's social standing, one's existence as a social being. . . whenever these threats arise, existential anxiety or fear is triggered off in us. They signal danger and mobilize our defense mechanisms. They prompt us to protect ourselves against this loss of safety, identity, self-esteem, love, freedom, meaning. . . they prompt us to construct and reconstruct the protective structures, physical and symbolic, of our lives. . .

Theories of ostracism (e.g., Williams, 2001), need to belong (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and social exclusion (e.g., MacDonald & Leary, 2005) also elucidate the power of social relationships in past and modern human society. For example, ostracism has been likened to “social death” (Williams, 2001), and some evidence suggests that “social rejection is perceived by the brain and other mechanisms as similar to physical injury” (Baumeister, DeWall, Mead, & Vohs, 2008: 146). Likewise, Trower and Gilbert (1989:21) argued that social anxiety disorders emanate from an evolutionary-based need to manage relationships and interactions in power hierarchies: “To a large degree, it is the subordinate's anxiety in relation to the dominant that ensures pointless fighting does not continually break out.” Empirical research supports this perspective, demonstrating that fear and stress (experienced automatically in the form of physiological changes such as increased cortisol levels; Cummins, 2005) result from threats to social status (Bugental, 2000; see also Sapolsky, 2005).

3.1.2. *Prepared fear and workplace silence*

Considering fear of challenging authority as a prepared fear helps explain the pervasiveness of silence in work organizations. If people are born with an innate preparedness (Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971) to be afraid of how authority figures may react, they will readily experience fear in situations in which hierarchy is salient, as in most work organizations. Prior theory supports this contention, suggesting that fear is an adaptive reaction to hierarchy and powerlessness (Kemper, 1978; Plutchik, 2003). We suggest that speaking up to someone in a position of authority at work – even with unthreatening content – is often tacitly understood by people as challenging the authority rather than merely asking questions or suggesting an improvement (Detert & Edmondson, 2008; Milliken & Morrison, 2003). In this way, contemplating voice stokes a prepared fear of angering higher-status others, which automatically triggers recognition of the potential for negative consequences. Thus, just as task conflict can often lead to friction or relationship conflict (Edmondson & Smith, 2006), recognition of status differences may lead to fear. Note that this argument does not require an individual to have had a previous bad experience with the current boss (or other higher status voice targets), because merely occupying the *role* of a dominant group member (boss) – along with the authority cues surrounding the role – is enough to sometimes signal “threat” and activate a fear-based response. Detert and Treviño (in press), for example, found that when explaining why it was unsafe to speak up to a particular boss, employees across organizational levels sometimes referenced a leader's place in the hierarchy rather than specific attributes of or experiences with that boss.

In short, we argue that, because human beings tend to assign formal titles and positions to communicate dominance (Kellerman, 2008), those who work in hierarchies attribute power (i.e., the ability to exact career and social consequences; Magee & Galinsky, 2008) to a superior's formal position. This power is likely to be only loosely related to the negative force a superior is actually able (or inclined) to wield. Essentially, the sensing mechanism of an employee is set to detect threat of dominant individuals without concern for accuracy. This “better safe than sorry” tendency captures the nature of interpersonal fear, creating a low threshold for its activation. Moreover, fears are rarely tested for accuracy (Bandura, 1986; LeDoux, 1996; Ohman, 1993).

If evolution has prepared humans to detect and respect authority, what cues might individuals automatically use to determine potential threat in dominant others? Research in the voice literature shows that certain verbal behaviors by leaders – such as a raised voice or insulting, abrasive, or threatening remarks – are clear signs of displeasure and therefore, trigger fear in subordinates (Ryan & Oestreich, 1991; Milliken et al., 2003). These types of aggressive displays may trigger high intensity fear and automatic, non-deliberative defensive silence. We argue that additional dominance cues, often more subtle ones, may also trigger silence in the presence of those authorities. First, indications of physical prowess in a target authority – such as height, weight, and stamina (Craske, 2003; Salska et al., 2008; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008) – may help elicit low intensity fear, feelings of apprehension, and cautious avoidance.

As a cognitive adaptation (Duntley, 2005), these characteristics of authority have become associated with negative consequences (such as physical confrontation that could lead to death or loss of status) by lower-status group members (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006). Even today, height is related to perceptions of competence, status, or dominance (Roberts & Herman, 1986; Young & French, 1996), and leadership emergence (Judge & Cable, 2004). Research has shown not only that objectively taller people are perceived differently (as the studies above indicate), but also that manipulating status signals leads to differential estimates of height (e.g., a stranger is perceived as taller when introduced as high status; Sundie, Cialdini, Griskevicius, & Kenrick, 2006).

The authority figure's gender – that is, gender of the would-be target for upward voice – may also signal that a target has more or less authority, and hence imposes more or less threat. Prior research has examined gender in voice behavior – notably examining whether women are more likely than men to remain silent; however, the results tend not to show a gender effect (e.g., Burger, 2009; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998; Miceli et al., 2008; Piderit & Ashford, 2003). However, in traditional hunter-gatherer societies, females' smaller physical stature and roles as gatherers led to males being accorded higher status (Barash, 1979). Research demonstrates that even today both men and women perceive men as having higher status across a wide array of situations (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1988; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Thus, these tenets of evolution research provide a basis to expect a gender-of-target effect in fear of speaking up to male rather than female authority figures. In support of this prediction is research showing that maleness is unconsciously related to power (Sundie et al., 2006). A focus on the *target's* gender represents a crucial reframing of traditional thinking about gender effects in voice research.

Another holdover from our distant past relevant to the workplace may be the tendency of certain physical movements and facial expressions to elicit a fear response (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006). Because humans automatically view rapid physical movement toward a target as a threatening behavior (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006), such physical behavior by authorities is likely to trigger higher intensity fear in subordinates. For example, recent research on dyadic interactions in a decision-making context indicated that the subordinate was less likely to speak up when the leader was perceived as exhibiting a “powerful demeanor” – manipulated with implicit cues of power such as strong posture (sitting up straight and taking up more space), direct eye contact, and confident tone of voice (Locke, 2008). Consistent with our arguments, perceived threat was found to mediate the leader cues and subordinate reticence to speak up in both the experimental study and a field study replication.

Anger-related facial expressions are also universal and include such features as raised nostrils, furrowed brow, wide open eyes, and erect head (Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, O'Sullivan, & Frank, 2008). Modern man is highly attuned to angry faces: “angry faces are spotted quickly and mistakes are rarely made regarding them. . . Angry expressers are implicitly perceived as threatening, competent, powerful, and dominant” (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006: 116). One interviewee in a voice study described a situation with an angry boss as follows:

He would be very emotional saying ‘it's bullshit’—these kinds of words, and also raising his voice. Getting up. Real dominant behavior towards the presenter. What you would see in a room like that is the twelve other people who were sitting at the table disappearing. “It's not me he's after, so let's keep quiet. Don't help the messenger,” who is being – verbally being killed. (Detert & Edmondson, 2005).

Research also has demonstrated that individuals misinterpret anger in unfamiliar others when they are experiencing fear (Maner et al., 2005). Moreover, Kramer (1996) suggested that low-status individuals (compared to those in authority) are more vigilant and attentive to trust-related cues, and “violations of trust will tend to ‘loom larger’ than confirmations of trust” (Kramer, 1996: 225). Thus, employees may misperceive a supervisor's anger – seeing it as more intense than the supervisor intended (c.f., Morrison & Rothman, 2009). In this way, supervisors who demonstrate anger through facial expressions or other gestures are likely to increase employees' fear of speaking up, both to them and to authorities in general. Some fear-invoking anger cues are obvious (such as bosses slamming their fists against a table, yelling, or cursing) while other more subtle anger cues (such as change in posture or reddening of face) may be detected by subordinates even when bosses are unaware of their own emotions. Interestingly, anger has been found to be related to perceptions of status, suggesting the potential for anger to reinforce status (and possibly fear) in a “vicious cycle” (Tiedens, 2000).

Lastly, we note that learning experiences related to evolutionary-based threats are especially persistent and difficult to extinguish (LeDoux, 1996; Mineka & Sutton, 2006). Because prepared fears are biologically based – rooted in the amygdala – they are difficult to eliminate *and* easy to re-trigger (see Ohman & Mineka, 2001 for a review). This asymmetry implies that even in a work environment of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999), where one generally feels safe speaking up, the deep-rooted fear of challenging authority is not erased (Myers, Ressler, & Davis, 2006). A

single bad (direct or indirect) experience with authority in that environment or in a future organization will likely trigger the automatic fear response related to fear of challenging authority (LeDoux, 1996; Myers et al., 2006).

3.2. *Learned origins of fear*

In addition to innate fear, the predisposition to *learn* to fear a particular stimulus is central to the adaptation and survival of human beings. Learning provides the opportunity for individuals to respond automatically to perceived danger without needing to continuously re-learn which stimuli are dangerous (LeDoux, 1996; Ohman & Wiens, 2001). Indeed, as noted earlier, the essence of most prepared fears is that they dispose individuals to more easily learn and retain understanding of threats that once represented significant dangers to prehistoric man.⁷ Thus, even if humans are predisposed (i.e., prepared) to fear challenging authority, the development of such fear also likely requires some related experiences to trigger and reinforce it (Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971).

According to Rachman (1990), fear can be learned either directly or indirectly through personal experiences, observation, or stories (see also Bandura, 1986; Izard, 1991). Starting with personal or direct experience, for example, an employee may be personally criticized or embarrassed by a superior:

...when I tried to introduce some new ideas at a meeting...the senior managers looked at me as if I was crazy. They made me feel dumb for sharing my thoughts. I received unkind emails in response to my suggestions. The tone was really bad. Now, I take caution before I speak up... (as quoted by Milliken et al., 2003: 1466)

Because affectively intense memories are particularly persistent (LeDoux, 1996), experiences such as the one recounted above are likely to trigger fear when the individual later encounters relevant cues reminiscent of the situation – even cues peripheral to the original event (e.g., configuration of the room) (Kreitler, 2004). Depending on the current stimuli against which they are matched, the learning represented in mental knowledge structures can lead to higher or lower intensity fear. Thus, as described earlier, learning about speaking up to authority can lead to silence based on some degree of deliberation and intentionality or, in some cases, to automatically triggered silence (Power & Dalgleish, 2008).

Fear is likely more often learned through indirect experiences, such as through observation or hearing about the experiences of others (in storytelling or conversation) (Rachman, 1990; Reiss, 1980). Across animals and human beings, this method of learning is considered to be a form of communication that is critical to survival (Scruton, 1986). By identifying an object or situation as threatening before it is personally encountered, individuals can reduce their risk of personal harm (Cummins, 2005; Dozier, 1998; Field, Argyris, & Knowles, 2001; Frijda, 1986; Olsson & Phelps, 2007). Neuroscience research has also found support for the idea that fear-related facial and vocal expressions may be part of an evolutionary-based response designed to warn others of danger and to alert them that the focal individual needs help (Chiao et al., 2008). In organizations, stories can be an influential means to “legitimate the power relations within the organization...[and to] rationalize existing practices, traditions, and rituals” (Martin & Powers, 1983: 97). Respondents in Milliken et al.’s (2003) interview study reported vicarious acquisition of fears of speaking up, as did those interviewed in Detert and Edmondson (2005). For example:

It’s almost instilled in you when you first come out, that you’ve got to be careful what you say here or whatever, because [they] will hold it against you. For example, a young lady who spoke up and was no longer with the company... That’s what the girl that trained me was telling me.

In addition to hearing stories, results from controlled psychological experiments demonstrate that simply watching another person being ridiculed increased fear of failure and conformity (Janes & Olson, 2000). When risk of being ridiculed by others was made salient, people were less creative, more risk averse, and more likely to conform. Thus, we should not be surprised when employees report fear of speaking up to specific leaders despite never having personally experienced negative outcomes for doing so. In short, “some intractable fears arise not from personally injurious experiences but from seeing others respond fearfully toward, or be hurt by, threatening objects” (Bandura, 1986: 186).

Whether through direct or indirect learning, the workplace is clearly fertile ground to experience fear of speaking up to authorities (e.g., Burris, 2005; Milliken et al., 2003; Ryan & Oestreich, 1991). Understandably, then, voice and

⁷ Although there are a few prepared fears that require no prior learning (e.g., fear of loud noises), most fall under this category of needing some prior learning, whether direct or indirect, to stimulate the fear (see LeDoux, 1996).

silence research has tended to focus on variables reflecting current organizational influences (e.g., top management openness, supervisor support, trust in supervisor, or climate factors; Detert & Burris, 2007; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli et al., 2008; Morrison & Milliken, 2000; Premeaux & Bedeian, 2003; Saunders, Sheppard, Knight, & Roth, 1992). However, future research should take care to separate the impact of current leaders and other current influences from those of prior leaders and times. For example, negative experiences with past bosses within the organization likely easily transfer to perceptions about the current one because of the enduring nature of fear-based memories (LeDoux, 1996). A vivid illustration of this effect comes from a research interview about speaking up with a manufacturing operator in a high-tech company (Detert & Edmondson, 2005):

A: “So ever since—that was 12 years ago, I still don’t trust anybody. I’ll say what I think is the right thing in a meeting, only because they actually gave us poor ratings that year.”

Q: “This is the same manager that’s still the plant manager?”

A: “No, that was three managers ago. Three plant managers ago.”

In this case, an employee who had a bad experience with a manager has refused to speak up to authority for *12 years and across three different managers*. Indeed, this type of response may provide some evidence for habituated silence – that is, after past fear-based incidences with authority, an employee may have engaged in silence as a safety behavior for so long that he or she now fails to even recognize situations where speaking up might be possible.

Future research should also distinguish between fear of challenging authority learned in one’s current organization versus in past places of employment. Increasingly, most adults have had experiences across multiple work organizations. These experiences often begin with exposure to strong hierarchical settings where compliance with rules, routinized procedures, and strict chains of command are the norm (e.g., entry-level service or manufacturing positions) (Reiter, 1996; see also Wolfson, 2005). If fear-based experiences indeed persist across time and space (as we have argued they do), then we might expect that much of what employees come to believe about the costs and benefits of speaking up gets imprinted during early work experiences. In particular, to the extent that young employees have strong direct or vicarious negative experiences, their beliefs about the dangers of speaking up are likely to diffuse to new organizations and, because “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), not be readily discarded even after later exposure to more innocuous environments.

Based on fear’s adaptive functions, we suggest that individuals also learn about the potential dangers of speaking up from experiences outside of work. These experiences will be subsequently stored in memory and later used to evaluate and respond to similar “dangerous” stimuli (e.g., Power & Dalgleish, 2008; Roseman & Smith, 2001). Therefore, we widen our lens below to consider how what is learned earlier and elsewhere in employees’ lives may generalize to how they perceive, appraise, and respond to opportunities to challenge authority figures in their current workplace. We arrange these factors by their position in the human lifespan starting with early childhood socialization, moving to socialization experiences in specific institutions, and, finally, to the ongoing expectations conveyed by national culture. Reviewing all possible influences on the development of a fear-based orientation toward challenging authority within each of these domains is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, we briefly highlight one or two proposed sources of influence within each area as a stimulus to future research.

3.2.1. *Childhood socialization*

Beginning early in life, parents and teachers often inculcate children with the belief that challenging authority is something to be feared and avoided (Milgram, 1974). Children (as young as 16 months old) are highly attuned to social rules and to violation of those rules by themselves and others, which is thought to be an evolutionary adaptation (Cummins, 2005). Children look to parents, teachers, and other adults (such as caregivers) to provide affective and behavioral guidance (Askew, Kessock-Philip, & Field, 2008; Rachman, 1990). For some, the message of obedience comes with a heavy dose of fear. For example, *To Train Up a Child* is a popular handbook for some conservative parents (Jones, 2007). In a process that appears to imitate classic fear conditioning, these authors argue that parents should train their young children to be obedient: “One spat with a little switch is enough. They will again pull back their hand and consider the relationship between the object, their desire, the command, and the little reinforcing pain” (Pearl & Pearl, 1994: 5). Parents may also unintentionally communicate through storytelling that challenging authority figures should be feared and avoided (Olsson & Phelps, 2007) and by showing fear of authority figures themselves

(Field et al., 2001; Muris, Bogels, Meesters, der Kamp, & van Oosten, 1996). Thus, common children's stories may become an influential source in the development of fear of speaking up to an authority figure. A classic children's book (Leaf, 1946: 45–47) still on the shelves of mainstream bookstores is filled with references to the foolishness and implied consequences of not listening to authority, and uses negative labeling (“stupid” or “not bright”) and fear-creating language (“for your own good health”) to drive home the message that authority figures should be obeyed. In another classic, Hans Christian Andersen's *The Emperor's New Clothes*, only the child is willing to point out that the emperor is naked. Yet, and perhaps more importantly, the story also vividly portrays the extent to which the adults fear telling the emperor something different than what he is presumed to want to hear – not only because of his power, but also for fear of looking stupid or inept.

Of course, other children's stories surely present messages about the importance of children using their own judgment, being willing to ask questions, and seeking to become leaders rather than followers. However, given the cognitive consequences of bad being stronger than good (Baumeister et al., 2001), multiple experiences with messages about reasons to exert caution around authority may inadvertently result in children internalizing the overall conclusion that challenging authority is unsafe. Other sources of this message for children may be “kitchen table” conversations or observation of events like the company picnic where parents have interactions with authorities (such as a supervisor) that are obviously “guarded.” Prior research suggests that children's work-related attitudes are affected by perceptions of their parents' work situation (e.g., Barling, Dupre, & Hepburn, 1998). Future research may even want to consider the effects of parenting style on reactions to authority figures later in life. For example, drawing on Baumrind's (1967) highly influential typology of parenting styles, children who are encouraged to follow rules in a supportive and affectionate relationship with parents (authoritative parenting style), or are encouraged to be independent (permissive parenting style), may experience less fear of challenging authority as adults. In contrast, parenting styles that discourage independence and individuality in a non-affectionate environment (authoritarian parenting style) may result in adults with an enhanced fear of challenging authority.

3.2.2. Institutional socialization

In addition to childhood experiences with parents and teachers, fear of challenging authority may be learned through membership in a variety of institutional settings. Here, we theorize briefly about the potential impact of one such institution, organized religion. Strict obedience to a religious doctrine, to a higher authority (god), and to the authority set by this higher authority is characteristic of many of the world's major religions. For example, from the Christian tradition,

All obedience is founded on authority that is understood to be derived from God and ordered to the good (John 19:11). Therefore, obedience to God includes obedience to duly established human authorities (McBrien, 1995: 927).

Mormonism is also “founded upon complete obedience to hierarchical Church authority” (as quoted in Krakauer, 2003: 93) and teaches that any deviance from the doctrine or church authority will result in “serious ecclesiastical consequences” (Lindsey, 1986: 36 as cited by O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996). Likewise, in Islam, followers are socialized to “trust in God, hear and obey” even when the followers are treated badly (Lewis, 1974: 160–161). Though not based on godly authority, the concept of *filial piety* is considered the “cornerstone” of Confucianism. Thus, in Asian cultures where Confucianism is prevalent, filial piety “justifies absolute parental authority over children, and by extension, the authority of those senior in general rank over those junior in rank” (Ho, 1996: 155; see also Fu, Wu, Yang, & Ye, 2007; Wu, 1996).

These examples demonstrate that many religions stress the importance of obedience to earthly authority. Yet, how do principles of obedience translate into fear of challenging authority? We have already described why individuals are predisposed to learn to associate disobedience to authority with negative consequences and thus, when considering disobedience (i.e., challenging a higher authority), experience fear. Taking Christianity as an example, submission to authorities is written as not only a matter of avoiding punishment by the God-appointed authority, but also avoiding disobeying God Himself (e.g., see Romans 13:2–3, 5, NIV). This notion is similarly expressed in Islam (Lewis, 1974). Individuals following these principles may view challenging authority (though likely not consciously in many cases) as disobeying a sacred higher authority – an action that may also come with divine consequences.

Of course, religious background alone does not guarantee that an individual will fear challenging authority or be unwilling to do so. Indeed, Christianity has a history of disobedience (see Kelman & Hamilton, 1989 for a review).

Additionally, differences exist among denominations or sects within any major religion. For instance, one of the main differences between Protestantism and Catholicism – both Christian religions – is rooted in beliefs regarding the fallibility of papal and other earthly authority (McBrien, 1995), a factor that may influence one's fear of challenging authority. Thus, while we argue that degree of religious affiliation may affect fear of challenging authority, research is necessary to understand when and to what extent this effect occurs.

3.2.3. *Cultural socialization*

At an even broader level, national culture may influence employee silence via its effect on fear of challenging authority (Edwards & Greenberg, 2009; Morrison & Rothman, 2009). National culture represents an ongoing influence, underlying much of what individuals learn in a given society and manifesting across various aspects of socialization including childhood development, education, work organizations, and other societal institutions (Hofstede, 1984; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). According to Frijda (1986: 311), culture helps socialize individuals to know the appropriate feeling rules and responses to various situations in their environment (see also Stets & Turner, 2008). As an example, the power distance dimension of culture refers to the extent to which members of a society accept status differences (Hofstede, 1984). At one end, individuals in high power distance countries (such as India and Singapore) tend to accept that distinctions between individuals exist along the lines of wealth, prestige, or power; at the other end, individuals in low power distance countries (such as the U.S. or the Netherlands) are less tolerant of these distinctions. This suggests that individuals from high power distance cultures will experience even more fear of challenging authority than those from low power distance cultures. For example, in Venezuela, “a highly stratified society where all powers are concentrated in the hand of the superior, the subordinate learns that it can be dangerous to question a decision of the superior” (Whyte, 1969: 37 as quoted by Hofstede, 1984). Because large power distinctions in high power distance cultures are widely held as legitimate, behavior (i.e., voice) that contradicts this cultural mindset is likely perceived as highly counter-normative. Furthermore, because the power distinctions are clear, the amount of power held by the superior might also be more apparent, making the subordinate more attuned to status cues that communicate threat, or the possibility of severe negative consequences. Therefore, even though humans may have a general preparedness to fear speaking up, we expect even more fear and perhaps higher intensity fear in high power distance cultures.

While the power distance dimension appears most directly related to fear of challenging authority, assertiveness has recently been suggested as another dimension related to the acceptability across cultures of “voicing disagreement to his or her boss” (House et al., 2004: 399). Though at first blush it may seem that cultures with more appreciation for assertiveness would have less fear of speaking up, we speculate that for the majority in such societies it may lead to more fear because “cultures rated high in assertiveness are probably more tolerant of strong, directive leaders” (House et al., 2004: 428). Given our evolutionary preparedness arguments, we think of cross-national differences as highlighting the extent to which cultures stoke the prepared fears residing within their citizens.

3.3. *Summary*

We have argued in this section that today's employees are not only biologically prepared to fear challenging authority but also socialized to do so through a wide array of influences extending well beyond one's current organization and work-based authority relationships. In this regard, and because fear-based learning is especially effortless and resilient, the cards seem stacked against individuals' engagement in open expression and thus against organizations' ability to routinely engender speaking truth to power. Yet clearly some employees do challenge authority at work, and sometimes do so in situations involving obvious fear for the speaker. In the next section, we consider two mechanisms that might lead some individuals to speak up despite some level of fear in situations where the majority would likely choose silence.

4. **Overcoming fear-based silence**

Thus far, we have argued for the persistent, resilient, and powerful influence of fear on employee workplace silence. Indeed, we believe fear is a far more common experience among employees faced with opportunities to speak up to authority figures than is widely recognized. An implication of this perspective, however, is that to challenge authority, employees must find a way to overcome the tendency to resort to silence. In short, individuals must be spurred to act courageously – that is, to take action *despite* fear (Rachman, 1990). Without suggesting that courage is likely to

become routine in organizational life, or that it should replace a focus on creating organizations where less courageous action is necessary, we consider in this section two individual-level factors that may co-exist with fear and thereby allow some individuals, some of the time, to speak up in situations perceived to present some level of risk. First, we suggest that anger – another strong, biologically-based emotion – may sometimes temper or even trump fear, in part because of anger’s powerful “approach” motivation. Second, we propose that voice efficacy – a learned belief in one’s competence to speak up effectively and to good effect – also can attenuate fear’s silencing effects.

4.1. Anger

Along with fear, anger is widely viewed as a basic emotion with primitive biologically-based origins (deCatanzaro, 1998). According to Lerner and Tiedens (2006: 117), anger is “associated with a sense that the self (or someone the self cares about) has been offended or injured.” In the workplace, research has shown that anger can be triggered by a variety of situations including public humiliation (Fitness, 2000; Harlos & Pinder, 2000), unjust or disrespectful treatment (Bies & Moag, 1986), and breaches of moral standards (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003). Similar to fear, anger is initially triggered when an individual perceives that a relevant goal is being threatened or blocked (primary appraisal). Then, the secondary appraisal involves an assessment that someone is responsible (oneself or another) for the blocked goal, that the offense is illegitimate in some way, and that the situation can be successfully changed (i.e., it has controllability) (Frijda, 1986; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Plutchik, 2003). These appraisals help determine the intensity of anger from “irritation/cold anger” (lower intensity) to “rage/hot anger” (higher intensity) (Scherer, 1986). In addition, in contrast to fear, “the purpose of anger is not to enable us to escape threatening or injurious situations but to destroy them or drive them away” (Plutchik, 2003: 326). Therefore, once triggered, anger motivates an *approach* or fight response that likely evolved to remove barriers from one’s ability to survive or succeed in the situation (Frijda, 1986).

4.1.1. Anger and fear-based silence

According to Lerner and Tiedens (2006: 126), anger and fear create opposite “perceptual lenses” for appraising and reacting to situations. Compared to a fearful person, an angry person is more certain about a negative event and its cause (e.g., another person), and perceives being more in control of events and more able to act to change the situation. Accordingly, the angry individual makes more optimistic risk assessments about the future and the likely success at changing the situation (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). These cognitions contribute to the approach tendency associated with anger that may provide a counterweight to fear’s inhibitory tendencies. However, the exact dynamics of the interaction between fear and anger remain unclear (e.g., Edwards et al., 2009).

In fearful voice situations where silence generally prevails, we propose that the outcomes of fear and anger’s interaction will be affected by the *intensity* of each emotion and the *immediacy* of the voice/silence decision (though acknowledging that for fear, intensity and immediacy are interrelated; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). We first consider situations where both emotions may be involved concurrently with the need to speak up or stay silent in the moment – such as during meetings where speaking up is a kind of “now or never” opportunity. Fig. 3 presents a summary of the




Fig. 3. Predicted outcome of fear and anger interaction.

possible combinations of fear and anger intensities in such situations, along with our predicted outcomes. First, we note that while fear and anger may be triggered simultaneously (see Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004) in response to the same event, we believe it is unlikely that high intensity fear can co-exist with high intensity anger. High intensity fear and high intensity anger result from contradictory primary appraisals, and the automatic response tendency in each is different. Thus, an employee “hijacked” by high intensity fear when blindsided by a boss’s outburst in a meeting is unlikely to *simultaneously* experience sufficient anger to overcome freezing into silence. In short, we expect the first high intensity discrete emotion to drive the behavioral outcome (see Fig. 3, upper right cell). Conversely, in situations evoking a lower intensity fear (i.e., a state of “heightened awareness” or “caution”), anger may be simultaneously experienced. In this case, a conflict occurs because one emotion (anger) is signaling approach and the other (fear) is signaling withdrawal (Frijda, 1986; Plutchik, 2003). For example, an employee may hear an unfair assessment being made about a project in which he or she was previously involved and therefore, feel angry about the insulting description but also concerned about challenging the authority figure’s assessment. Assuming both emotions are experienced at about equal low to moderate intensity, we predict fear, and therefore silence, will prevail because fear is rooted in prehistoric survival-based instincts and characterized by the “better safe than sorry” mentality of the fear module (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Further, fear pre-dates the existence of anger (TenHouton, 2007) and so may take precedence over anger at equivalent levels of both.

Turning to the other two cells of Fig. 3, where the intensity of one emotion significantly exceeds that of the other (Fig. 3, upper left and lower right cells), we build on prior arguments that anger can be strong enough to override the avoidance or withdrawal tendencies of fear in some voice-related situations (e.g., Gundlach, Douglas, et al., 2003; Gundlach, Martinko, et al., 2003). We suggest however that anger must be far stronger than fear to overcome fear’s silencing effects. First, as noted above, the adaptive primacy of fear suggests that it is likely to dominate other emotions of equal valence. More importantly, the expression of anger is usually counter-normative (c.f., Geddes & Callister, 2007); through socialization, individuals have learned strict display rules related to anger. Indeed, TenHouton (2007: 40–41) argued that anger requires “an exercise of power” and includes secondary appraisals of the “dangerous or damaging retaliation” that might follow an anger display. Therefore, employees may be reluctant to give in to the approach motivation tendencies of anger unless the anger emotion is significantly stronger than the fear emotion. It may take, for example, significant moral outrage or significant emotional offense for anger to over-ride fear (e.g., Henik, 2008). Such “how dare you!” reactions seem likely to be relatively rare compared with the day-to-day experience of noticing process problems or product improvements. Given our prior descriptions of high-intensity fear, it should be no surprise that our prediction for the fourth (upper left) cell of Fig. 3 – high fear, low anger – is fear-based silence. That is, employees who are only modestly angry are unlikely in the face of significant fear-inducing stimuli (e.g., an irate boss) to speak up in the moment.

When a choice between voice and silence is not immediate, time may shift the behavioral choice as one emotional response fades and/or the other grows stronger. This is consistent with the appraisal feedback loop (e.g., Power & Dalgleish, 2008; Smith & Kirby, 2001) and recursive relationship of emotions (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006) described earlier. For example, the fear initially triggered by threat cues may later be overtaken by anger. This may be particularly likely for situations initially evoking relatively low intensity fear, as fear’s carryover effects may not be strong enough to block appraisals that would trigger anger. For instance, an employee who withholds challenging the accuracy of key information in a meeting may subsequently stew on the negative implications of what was presented until sufficient anger fuels a decision to go to the manager’s office to speak up. Indeed, for individuals who ultimately blew the whistle, Henik (2008) found that anger was often a vital motivator despite some fear of retaliation.

In contrast, for higher intensity fear, we expect that the pessimistic carryover effects for fear will be too strong to allow for the more optimistic appraisals (e.g., control) necessary to trigger anger-driven voice. For example, the employee who is being “chewed out” by an angry and cursing boss is likely to experience higher intensity fear – and therefore be silent – in the moment. Despite the perception that his or her project is being assessed unfairly, the fear-laden employee will likely be pessimistic about the risks, controllability, and success of challenging the boss (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Even after the meeting has ended and the employee becomes increasingly angry while replaying the dialogue mentally, the strong fear-based memories of the situation will likely stifle any decision to approach the boss in the near future with discretionary voice about the incident.

4.1.2. Anger on behalf of others

In the examples above, we focused on incidences where a focal employee experiences anger due to a perceived threat to his or her *own* well-being. However, anger can also be triggered by “a demeaning offense against me *and mine*” (Lazarus, 1991: 221; *italics ours*), thereby extending the causes of anger to include offenses against others one cares about. Hoffman (2008) used the term *empathetic anger* to describe the sense of violation (of what “ought” to be) one experiences on behalf of someone who has suffered an infraction by another individual. This idea of empathetic anger is an extension of general empathy, defined as the “apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition” (Eisenberg, 2000: 671). Whereas empathy involves simply understanding and sharing the feelings related to another’s plight, empathetic anger includes an element of action on the other’s behalf: it spurs a “natural feeling of retaliation. . .” (Mills, 1952 as quoted by Hoffman, 2008: 447) and the approach characteristics associated with anger (including perceptions of control and optimism of success).

We know of no literature that investigates or extends the concept of empathetic anger, but we believe it may help an employee to overcome fear-based silence in certain circumstances, in particular those involving modest fear but extreme offense or threat to others. For example, higher intensity empathetic anger experienced when a close colleague is belittled, blatantly discriminated against, or unfairly blamed for a costly mistake may trigger an automatic approach response that over-rides fear’s silencing effects. Other examples may include concern for the greater good or public welfare (Henik, 2008; see also Jones, 1991). As theorized for self-focused anger, empathetic anger of lower intensity may slightly reduce appraisals of uncontrollability and uncertainty (given anger’s optimistic perceptions lens), but may still be insufficient to override self-protective motives if fear is also present. As an example, an employee who is already experiencing fear in a meeting will be “on alert” for further threat cues. Seeing a coworker treated unfairly by the boss may stimulate some empathetic anger, but may also exacerbate the perceived reasons to be afraid of challenging authority; thus, in this type of situation, empathetic anger may not be enough to generate voice. This is consistent with the earlier example in which employees at a meeting began to “disappear under the table” to find safety as a fellow co-worker was “verbally being killed.”

4.1.3. A note on anger displays

While anger has the potential to be a positive force for overcoming fear-based silence, anger can also create problems, particularly when a subordinate expresses anger to an authority figure. First, expressions of anger, especially intense forms of anger, can lead to aggression (Power & Dalglish, 2008), offend observers (see Geddes & Callister, 2007), or invite counter-anger or avoidance (Turner, 2000). Second, angry individuals feel empowered, optimistic, and in control (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). As a result, they may be less thoughtful and more passionate with their language and delivery than a less angry person would be. Recent research found that some managers had a decidedly negative view about the functionality of anger: Those viewing anger as dysfunctional saw anger as irrational, unnecessary, and likely to cloud judgment (Mikel & Ozcelik, 2008). Given their lower power relative to the target, subordinates expressing anger upward are more likely to be seen in these unflattering ways. In a similar vein, negotiation research finds that low-power negotiators derive little benefit from anger displays. In fact, high power negotiators tend to retaliate against angry counterparts rather than concede (Van Kleef & Cote, 2007). Furthermore, anger displays are common among highly assertive individuals, who research has shown are rated worse due to lower social effectiveness (Ames, 2008; Ames & Flynn, 2007). Indeed, negative views of anger are particularly strong in many cultures (such as East Asian societies) where self-control is highly valued and expression of anger is strongly discouraged. For example, in Japan, “for the offended party to manifest anger, through facial expression or raised voice, would denote that his self-discipline and manners had failed him” (Walton, 2004: 54). Some cultures discourage anger expression so strongly that they have few words for it and its expression is rare. Therefore, encouraging subordinates to show anger toward their bosses is often not in the individual’s best interest and may not achieve the desired outcome. Future research is needed to investigate whether, when, and how anger can be used constructively to overcome fear’s silencing effects in situations involving possible voice to authority figures.

4.2. Voice efficacy

According to Bandura (1986), people fear situations largely because of their perceptions that they are unable to cope. Defined as “beliefs in one’s capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet given situational demands” (Wood & Bandura, 1989: 408), self-efficacy appears to be one avenue by

which individuals can develop the cognitive skills necessary to overcome fear's silencing effects. Stated simply, self-efficacy involves beliefs that one possesses important skills as well as the ability to use those skills effectively to exercise control over events in life. Efficacy beliefs influence choices, the amount of effort invested, and persistence because people avoid situations that they feel incapable of handling (Bandura, 1977, 2001; Maddux, 1995). When compared to those high in self-efficacy, those low in self-efficacy view challenges as more formidable and they give up more easily because they doubt their capability to be effective. In addition to generalized self-efficacy that applies broadly across tasks and life domains, self-efficacy can be task or context specific (Bandura, 1986). For example, Mitchell and Palmer (2007: 7) introduced the "ethical efficacy" construct, which refers to individuals' beliefs in their "ability to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action necessary to execute ethical behavior," and found support for ethical efficacy's influence on "individual initiative behaviors."

To overcome the tendency toward silence in fear-laden voice situations, we argue that individuals can and do sometimes develop beliefs about their abilities to cope. That is, through repeated successful, or even partially successful, experiences speaking up, individuals can develop *voice efficacy*. Similar to past negative experiences that can exacerbate one's fear of challenging authority (as described earlier), voice efficacy is likely advanced by a wide range of past positive experiences with speaking up about various issues within past or current work settings and in other situations (e.g., to parents who encouraged speaking up throughout childhood). The proposed impact of voice efficacy may occur in two ways. First, because fear intensity is influenced in part by secondary appraisals of (un)controllability in a threatening situation (Bandura, 1986; Frijda, 1986; Plutchik, 2003), individuals with higher voice efficacy will likely (all else equal) appraise a situation as more controllable and therefore, via perceptions of lower threat severity, experience lower levels of fear than individuals with low voice efficacy. In addition, past positive experiences by high voice efficacy individuals can create long-term memories that may be matched against current situations to determine fear intensity during the appraisal process (LeDoux, 1996). Second, the existence of higher domain-specific efficacy means individuals believe they can succeed despite the challenges inherent in performing the activity (Bandura, 1986). Thus, even when they do experience fear in voice situations, individuals with higher voice efficacy should be more willing to speak up despite the fear. For example, a high voice efficacy individual is still likely to experience some level of fear in the presence of a defensive, critical boss; the individual is just more likely to speak up anyway. However, even for high voice efficacy individuals, we suggest that voice efficacy is likely to play little, if any, role in preventing automatic, non-deliberative silence in high fear intensity situations because of the fear module's "better safe than sorry" bias. Alternatively, in situations not requiring an immediate response, individuals with higher voice efficacy may be more likely to decide to speak up after the initial high intensity fear reaction has passed.

4.2.1. *Developing voice efficacy*

If voice efficacy can help an individual overcome the tendency toward silence and positive experiences with speaking up help develop voice efficacy, the question of how individuals can have more positive voice experiences is an important one. We discuss here three possibilities: the development over time of skills with regard to anger expression, verbal communication, and emotional intelligence.

First, above we proposed anger as an important counter-emotion that may help people speak up despite fear. But, we also cautioned that anger expression in organizations can be problematic (Geddes & Callister, 2007). When an authority figure sees the expression of anger as dysfunctional, it will reduce the chances that an angry person's ideas are heard and accepted, thus leading to negative consequences, including rejection of ideas and social exclusion. Such consequences produce negative, fear-laden experiences that detract from the development of voice efficacy. Therefore, learning to temper one's outward displays of anger may be critical to having the positive experiences that contribute to higher voice efficacy.

According to Geddes and Callister (2007: 721), anger becomes deviant when it crosses the *impropriety threshold*, or the point at which expressed anger "violates organizational emotion-display norms." For low status employees, this threshold is probably lower than it is for high status employees because of perceived differences in the legitimacy of unrestricted expression (Geddes & Callister, 2007; Tiedens, 2001). Therefore, to be effective, employees may need to engage in "expressive suppression" – that is, to "attempt to decrease ongoing emotion-expressive behavior" (Gross, 2008: 504) while speaking up. Although expressive suppression does have cognitive costs (Gross, 2008), employees speaking up to authority in a controlled manner will be less likely to cross the impropriety threshold and will be more likely to channel anger's passion and energy into a successful or positive experience.

While emotional control is an important first step, it is by no means a guarantee of positive experiences challenging authority. A second component that may assist in strengthening voice efficacy is the development of voice-related verbal skills. Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, and Lawrence (2001), for example, identified successful issue selling tactics such as framing arguments rationally and in alignment with the organization's norms and language. Similarly, Sonenshein (2006) found that individuals "craft reality" for leaders through the use of economic or normative arguments. Learning how to frame issues and deliver messages appropriately (e.g., present criticisms using non-threatening language) could help produce more positive experiences with authority figures and ultimately increase voice efficacy. This increased voice efficacy will likely promote a personal sense of control and ability to cope. Of course, the development of skills that allow one to deliver one's *intended* message is different from becoming skillful at non-genuine communication aimed at self-preservation rather than genuine transmission of ideas – for example, by using metaphors, indirect language (Edmondson, 2002), or "defensive voice" (e.g., saying "I agree" to a manager even when not true; Van Dyne et al., 2003). Such behaviors are used to protect the speaker from negative outcomes (e.g., target retaliation), but do not constitute voice efficacy; instead, they may reinforce the belief that one is not capable of honest communication to authority. In sum, practicing skills to engage in genuine expressions to authority is likely to lead to voice efficacy and willingness to act despite fear, while the use of defensive behaviors are likely to only reinforce fear and the future use of "safety behaviors."

Finally, employees with better skills in reading targets and sizing up situations may also have more positive experiences that contribute to voice efficacy. According to Salovey, Detweiler-Bedell, Detweiler-Bedell, and Mayer (2008), emotional intelligence includes the ability to perceive one's own and others' emotions and to use this knowledge to facilitate and manage those emotions. This suggests that emotional intelligence will play "a significant role in impression management and persuasion" (Salovey et al., 2008: 538). Employees with higher emotional intelligence may be more adept at reading and responding to an authority's emotional state (such as anger or sadness) and assessing the appropriate time and method of approach for speaking up. Gundlach and colleagues (Gundlach, Martinko & Douglas, 2003) argued that emotional intelligence affects self-efficacy beliefs by helping individuals understand the relationship between their causal attributions of an event and their feelings about that event. In this way, emotional intelligence may also help an employee process opportunities to speak up more accurately so that, for example, the disappointment felt after an "unsuccessful" voice attempt (e.g., the suggestion was not taken) will be understood in context (e.g., the boss was not angry or disappointed, just unable to act on the suggestion) and will not negatively impact overall voice efficacy.

4.2.2. *The motivation to develop voice efficacy*

Our presentation of voice efficacy leaves the construct open for development. One important question is, "What will motivate employees to want to develop voice efficacy?" After all, unlike the capacity to experience anger, which comes automatically to normal individuals whose well-being is threatened, individuals are not born with the capacity to skillfully speak up in difficult situations. As described earlier, fear-based silence has its roots in a lifetime of implicit and explicit messages that challenging authority is unsafe. Furthermore, the effect of "bad is stronger than good" (Baumeister et al., 2001) coupled with the resiliency of fear-based memories (Ohman & Mineka, 2001) and the pessimistic tone of fear-influenced risk and outcome judgments (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006) suggest that voice efficacy will be difficult to develop. Particularly in the early stages, individuals must be willing to overcome their fear of challenging authority *in order to have* the positive experiences that build efficacy. For in-role tasks that are fear-laden, employees are presumably motivated to increase their efficacy because of the rewards associated with success and the punishments for non-performance. For example, people who detonate bombs see this as a job requirement and therefore overcoming fear as essential to job success. But, if speaking up to authority with suggestions or concerns is an extra-role behavior, such that its *absence* is rarely punished (Van Dyne et al., 1995), employees likely view this behavior as something that is "nice to do but not required." We suspect, therefore, that only those who have a particular interest in personally developing their ability to communicate successfully in various life domains will make the effort required to develop voice-related efficacy on their own. For example, individuals with a strong desire to improve important yet difficult relationships (e.g., with an easily angered spouse, parent, coworker, or boss) or to quickly ascend organizational ladders into senior leadership roles may feel compelled to develop skills that move them past their fear of speaking up.

5. Discussion

Fear, a powerful and pervasive emotion, influences human perception, cognition, and behavior in ways and to an extent that we find underappreciated in much of the organizational literature. This chapter draws from a broad range of literatures, including evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and anthropology, to provide a fuller understanding of how fear influences silence in organizations. Our intention is to provide a foundation to inform future theorizing and research on fear's effects in the workplace, and to elucidate why people at work fear challenging authority and thus how fear inhibits speaking up with even routine problems or suggestions for improvement.

Our review of the literature on fear generated insights with the potential to extend theory on silence in several ways. First, we proposed that silence should be differentiated based on the intensity of fear experienced and the time available for choosing a response. Both non-deliberative, low-road silence and conscious but schema-driven silence differ from descriptions in extant literature of defensive silence as intentional, reasoned and involving an expectancy-like mental calculus. Thus, our proposed typology (in Fig. 2) suggests the need for content-specific future theory and research. For example, the description of silence as the result of extended, conscious deliberation may fit choices about whistleblowing and major issue selling well, while not explaining how individuals decide to speak up or remain silent in more routine high fear intensity or high immediacy situations. We also theorized that as a natural outcome of humans' innate tendency to avoid the unpleasant characteristics of fear, employees may develop a type of habituated silence behavior that is largely unrecognized by them.

We expanded understanding of the antecedents of workplace silence by explaining in detail how prior (individual and societal) experiences affect the perceptions, appraisals, and outcomes of fear-based silence. Noting that the fear of challenging authority has roots in the biological mechanisms developed to aid survival in early humans, we argued that this prepared fear is continually developed and reinforced through a lifetime of experiences across most social institutions (e.g., family, school, religion) that implicitly and explicitly convey messages about authority relationships. Over time, these direct and indirect learning experiences, coupled with the characteristics of an evolutionary-based fear module, become the memories and beliefs against which current stimuli in moments of possible voice are compared.

Finally, we proposed two factors to help explain why and how certain individuals speak up to authority despite experiencing some fear of doing so. Though the deck is clearly stacked in favor of fear and silence, anger as a biologically-based emotion and voice efficacy as a learned belief in one's ability to successfully speak up in difficult voice situations may help employees prevail over fear – in part, through their influence on the control appraisals that are central to emotional experience.

5.1. *Research implications and opportunities*

The ideas developed in this chapter present scholars with many avenues for future research on the nature, causes, and types of fear-based silence in organizational life. Rather than attempt to provide here an exhaustive summary of the issues already covered, we conclude with three additional observations about ways to further extend theory and research on organizational silence.

First, there are noteworthy measurement challenges associated with future research on the constructs described in this chapter – namely, the differing types of silence driven by varying fear intensities and time available for choosing a response. While the lack of challenging verbal behavior can be recognized, its motives cannot readily be discerned by others (Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2008; Van Dyne et al., 2003). For example, Parker et al. (2009) reported low, non-significant correlations between self-reported motives and supervisors' attributions for subordinate silence. Thus, the general frequency of fear-laden silence – especially its more conscious, deliberative form – is likely better assessed via self-report. Evidence for a new measure of defensive silence suggests that the construct can be differentiated empirically from silence driven by other motives (e.g., prosocial silence, self-enhancing silence) and that the measure shows theoretically-expected relationships with other constructs (e.g., positive relationship with anxiety) (Parker et al., 2009).

Despite these promising results, reliance on post hoc self-report is likely to be deficient in some respects, especially for isolating the role that fear plays in specific episodes and for gauging automatic fear responses. Thus, to advance research, new methods may be required to capture fear and its silencing effect on employees. Researchers might devise experimental situations that evoke fear-based silence while controlling for other potential motives (e.g., situations

where silence would *not* protect others or enhance one's own image). In laboratory settings, fear as a discrete emotion could then be measured by distinct changes in physiology including heart rate, skin conductance (e.g., Fenz & Epstein, 1967; Ohman, 2008), automatic facial expressions (Matsumoto et al., 2008; Blascovich, 2000), and cortisol levels (stress-related hormone collected through saliva or blood) (e.g., Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1994; McCullough, Ursulak, Brandon, & Akers, 2007). Additionally, PET and fMRI scans have been used to measure fear-related brain activity (see LeDoux & Phelps, 2008 for a review). Various subliminal priming (see Ohman, 1993, 2008 for examples) or fear-inducing activities could also be used to systemically study how lower and higher intensities of fear predict silence.

Incorporating these quite intrusive approaches into the assessment of fear in real work settings is likely to remain problematic pending advances in measurement. However, we believe it is possible to find a fruitful middle ground between post hoc or general tendency self-report measures of silence in actual organizations and more rigorous measures presumed to be viable only in laboratory settings. For example, researchers might tape numerous decision-making meetings in organizations and then replay them for participants. Participants can be directed to reflect on what they felt during the meeting (as the video plays) while the researcher uses physiological measurements (e.g., cortisol measurements via saliva; see Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1994 for a review) to assess how subordinates' fear intensity levels shifted during the meeting, especially during moments where subordinates recognize that they were withholding information from more powerful decision-makers.

A second issue – beyond the scope of this chapter but requiring future attention – is the role of personality differences in fear-based silence. Here we suggest that researchers may profit from differentiating personality influences into three groups: (1) personality differences that affect voice or silence for reasons unrelated to fear, (2) personality differences affecting voice or silence by affecting the level of fear experienced, and (3) personality differences enabling individuals to overcome fear. The personality traits examined in prior voice-related research tend to fall into the first category, because they are related to taking initiative or responsibility (e.g., proactive personality, locus of control) rather than to the experience of fear (e.g., Detert & Burris, 2007; LePine & Van Dyne, 1998, 2001; Premeaux & Bedeian, 2003; Seibert, Kraimer, & Crant, 2001; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990; Withey & Cooper, 1989). Neuroticism and dispositional shyness are two candidates for further exploration in the second category, because of their conceptual link to fear susceptibility (Caprara, Steca, Cervone, & Artisticco, 2003; LePine & Van Dyne, 2001). For example, neuroticism is the personality trait most closely related to vulnerability to experiencing fear or anxiety (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Individuals high in neuroticism tend to be more sensitive to threats of pain, punishment, and failure and are highly responsive to situations that produce negative emotions. Personality differences that predict greater or lesser willingness to act despite fear – the third type of individual differences meriting attention – have been less well developed; there is currently a lack of research on the “courageous” personality type. Given the potential of anger to counteract fear, as argued above, researchers might consider dispositional differences related to the propensity to feel angry, such as inequity or injustice sensitivity.

Finally, in addition to individual level variables, future research should consider the effect of organizational culture and other organizational factors on helping employees overcome their fear of speaking up. Prior research has carefully articulated the social dynamics leading to collective perceptions that challenging authority is unsafe in a particular organization – that is, the dynamics that stoke fear and lead to collective silence (Morrison & Milliken, 2000). Our review in this chapter certainly supports the idea that such dynamics are likely to be pervasive in organizations, teaching and reinforcing, rather than helping to break down, the fear associated with speaking up. Researchers and theorists might also examine the opposite, describing the nature of carefully cultivated organizational cultures that systematically reduce fear of speaking up and/or motivate employees to speak up despite lingering fears (as a methodological example, see Weick and Roberts (1993) and their examination of flight carriers).

More research is needed on how leaders might create systems that break down barriers to voice that they themselves have not created (e.g., messages internalized long ago about the dangers of speaking up) (Detert & Treviño, *in press*). Similarly, research is needed on how to foster motivation to speak up despite fear. One topic for investigation is how some organizations manage to recast challenging upward voice as an in-role behavior that is necessary to meet basic performance expectations. Such organizations may be found to have incentive systems (e.g., those including rewards for cost savings or revenue growth generated by voice, or those making pay significantly contingent on learning-oriented behaviors) or promotion decision processes (e.g., requiring evidence of ‘challenging’ and ‘creative’ voice rather than criteria that may favor the promotion of ‘yes men’) that increase employees' motivation to develop voice efficacy and to overcome inherent tendencies toward silence. Another possibility is that some organizations have

learned to harness the power of organizational identity (Brickson, 2000), such that employees actually care enough about the organization to feel angry about and personally responsible for doing something about perceived threats to the organization's well-being. Though prior research suggests that feeling attached to an organization is insufficient to stimulate voice (i.e., it may indicate a preference for the organization as it *is*) (Burris, Detert, & Chiaburu, 2008), individuals have been shown to develop a sense of ownership of an organization (reporting “lov[ing] this place”) that led to norms of accountability including “saying your piece” at meetings (Barker, 1993). A question for future research is whether (and if so, how) leaders can stimulate similarly strong identification with the organization as a whole, and thereby associated willingness to speak up to authority despite fear.

5.2. Conclusion

Human beings have been protected and plagued by the emotion of fear since the beginning of our existence. In this chapter, we sought to better explain fear's legacy – its origins, mechanisms, and vulnerabilities – and to provide an integrated and comprehensive perspective on fear in relation to its implications for workplace silence. Yet fear's implications clearly do not stop with silence, but rather extend to other organizational behaviors and outcomes as well. Communication and co-worker relations in teams, intergroup relations, boundary spanning, and learning are just a few organizational constructs with conceptual relationships to fear that could be elaborated in future work. Our aspiration is thus to trigger new dialogue on fear in organizational behavior. We hope that our review and ideas will inform future theory and research on voice and silence – and help elucidate fear's influence on other aspects of organizational behavior as well.

Acknowledgments

We extend a special thanks to the ROB editors, Art Brief and Barry Staw, as well as to Ethan Burris, Dan Chiaburu, Russell Cropanzano, Stephen Humphrey, Vilmos Misangyi, Terrance Mitchell, Nathan Pettit, Michael Price, Sean Tucker, Glenda Fisk, Sean Martin, and members of the ORG seminar in the Management and Organization Department, Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University for feedback on earlier drafts.

References

- Ames, D. R. (2008). In search of the right touch: Interpersonal assertiveness in organizational life. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 17(6), 381–385.
- Ames, D. R., & Flynn, F. J. (2007). What breaks a leader: The curvilinear relation between assertiveness and leadership. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 92(2), 307–324.
- Andersen, H. C. (2004). *The Emperor's New Clothes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Appelbaum, S. H., Bregman, M., & Moroz, P. (1998). Fear as a strategy: Effects and impact within the organization. *Journal of European Industrial Training*, 22(3), 113–127.
- Archer, J. (1988). *The behavioural biology of aggression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ashford, S. J. (1998). Championing charged issues: The case of gender-equity within organizations. In R. M. Kramer & M. A. Neale (Eds.), *Power and influence in organizations* (pp. 349–380). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ashford, S. J., Rothband, N. P., Piderit, S. K., & Dutton, J. E. (1998). Out on a Limb: The role of context and impression management in selling gender-equity issues. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 43, 23–57.
- Ashford, S. J., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Christianson, M. K. (2009). Speaking up and speaking out: The leadership dynamics of voice in organizations. In M. S. Edwards & J. Greenberg (Eds.), *Voice and silence in organizations* (pp. 175–201). Bingley: Emerald Group.
- Askew, C., Kessock-Philip, H., & Field, A. P. (2008). What happens when verbal threat information and vicarious learning combine? *Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy*, 36, 491–505.
- Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. *Psychological Review*, 84, 191–215.
- Bandura, A. (1986). *Social foundations of thought and action*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
- Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 52, 1–26.
- Barash, D. (1979). *The whisperings within: Evolution and the origin of human nature*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Barker, J. R. (1993). Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 38, 408–437.
- Barling, J., Dupre, K. E., & Hepburn, C. G. (1998). Effect of parents' job insecurity on children's work beliefs and attitudes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83(1), 112–118.
- Barlow, D. H. (2002). *Anxiety and its disorders*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Barnard, C. I. (1938). *The functions of the executive*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Barsade, S. G., Brief, A. P., & Spataro, S. E. (2003). The affective revolution in organizational behavior: The emergence of a paradigm. In J. Greenberg (Ed.), *Organizational behavior: The state of the science*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

- Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. *Review of General Psychology*, 5, 323–370.
- Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Mead, N. L., & Vohs, K. D. (2008). Social rejection can reduce pain and increase spending: Further evidence that money, pain, and belongingness are interrelated. *Psychological Inquiry*, 19, 145–147.
- Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachment as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 117, 497–529.
- Baumrind, D. (1967). Child care practices anteceding three patterns of preschool behavior. *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 75, 43–88.
- Berkowitz, L., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2004). Toward an understanding of the determinants of anger. *Emotion*, 4(2), 107–130.
- Bies, R. J., & Moag, J. F. (1986). Interactional justice: Communication criteria of fairness. In R. J. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard, & M. H. Bazerman (Eds.), *Research on negotiations in organizations* (pp. 43–55). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Blanchard, D. C., & Blanchard, R. J. (2008). Defensive behaviors, fear, and anxiety. In Blanchard, R. J., Blanchard, D. C., Griebel, G., & Nutt, D. (Eds.), *Handbook of anxiety and fear*. Vol. 17 (pp.63–80). Boston: Academic Press.
- Blascovich, J. (2000). Psychophysiological methods. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.), *Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology* (pp. 117–137). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Blenkinsopp, J., & Edwards, M. S. (2008). On not blowing the whistle: Quiescent silence as an emotion episode. In Zerbe, W. J., Hartel, C. E. J. & Ashkanasy, N. M. Eds. *Research on emotion in organizations: Emotions, ethics, and decision-making*. Vol. 4 (pp.181–206). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Bowen, F., & Blackmon, K. (2003). Spirals of silence: The dynamic effects of diversity on organizational voice. *Journal of Management Studies*, 40(6), 1393–1417.
- Brickson, S. (2000). The impact of identity orientation on individual and organizational outcomes in demographically diverse settings. *Academy of Management Journal*, 25(1), 82–101.
- Brief, A. P., & Weiss, H. M. (2002). Organizational behavior: Affect in the workplace. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 53, 279–307.
- Brockner, J., Heuer, L., Siegel, P. A., Wiesenfeld, B., Martin, C., Grover, S., et al. (1998). The moderating effect of self-esteem in reaction to voice: Converging evidence from five studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75, 394–407.
- Bugental, D. B. (2000). Acquisition of the algorithms of social life: A domain-based approach. *Psychological Bulletin*, 126(2), 187–219.
- Burger, J. M. (2009). Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey today? *American Psychologist*, 64, 1–11.
- Burris, E. R. (2005). *The politics of speaking out: Responses to voice in organizations*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University.
- Burris, E. R., Detert, J. R., & Chiaburu, D. S. (2008). Quitting before leaving: The mediating effects of psychological attachment and detachment on voice. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 93(4), 912–922.
- Caprara, G. V., Steca, P., Cervone, D., & Artistic, D. (2003). The contribution of self-efficacy beliefs to dispositional shyness: On social-cognitive systems and the development of personality dispositions. *Journal of Personality*, 71(6), 943–970.
- Chiaburu, D. S., Marinova, S. V., & Van Dyne, L. (2008). Should I do it or not? An initial model of cognitive processes predicting voice behaviors. In L. T. Kane & M. R. Powell (Eds.), *Citizenship in the 21st century* (pp. 127–153). New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Chiang, H., & Pepper, G. A. (2006). Barriers to nurses' reporting of medication administration errors in Taiwan. *Journal of Nursing Scholarship*, 38(4), 392–399.
- Chiao, J. Y., Iidaka, T., Gordon, H. L., Nogawa, J., Bar, M., Aminoff, E., et al. (2008). Cultural specificity in amygdala responses to fear faces. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 20(12), 2167–2174.
- Chorpita, B. F., & Barlow, D. H. (1998). The development of anxiety: The role of control in the early environment. *Psychological Bulletin*, 124(1), 3–21.
- Cohen-Charash, Y., & Mueller, J. S. (2007). Does perceived unfairness exacerbate or mitigate interpersonal counterproductive work behaviors related to envy? *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92(3), 666–680.
- Cortina, L. M., & Magley, V. J. (2003). Raising voice, risking retaliation: Events following interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, 8(4), 247–265.
- Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2000). Evolutionary psychology and the emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 91–115). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Craske, M. G. (2003). *Origins of phobias and anxiety disorders: Why more women than men?* Oxford, U.K. Pergamon Press.
- Creed, W. E. D. (2003). Voice lessons: Tempered radicalism and the use of voice and silence. *Journal of Management Studies*, 40(6), 1503–1536.
- Cropanzano, R., Goldman, B., & Folger, R. (2003). Deontic justice: The role of moral principles in workplace fairness. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 24, 1019–1024.
- Cummins, D. (2005). Dominance, status, and social hierarchies. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), *The handbook of evolutionary psychology* (pp. 676–697). Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
- de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). *Our inner ape*. New York, NY: Riverhead Books.
- deCatanzaro, D. A. (1998). *Motivation and emotion: Evolutionary, physiological, developmental and social perspectives*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.
- Detert, J. R. (2003). *To speak or not to speak: The multi-level influences on voice and silence in organizations*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
- Detert, J. R., & Burris, E. R. (2007). Leadership behavior and employee voice: Is the door really open? *Academy of Management Journal*, 50(4), 869–884.
- Detert, J. R., & Edmondson, A. C. (2005). *Everyday failures in organizational learning: Explaining the high threshold for speaking up at work* (Harvard Business School Working Paper Series, no. 06-024).
- Detert, J. R., & Edmondson, A. C. (2008). *The nature and sources of implicit theories of voice*. Presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting in Anaheim, CA.

- Detert, J. R., & Treviño, L. K. (in press). Speaking up to higher ups: How supervisors and skip-level leaders influence employee voice. *Organization Science*.
- Dovidio, J. F., Brown, C. E., Heltman, K., Ellyson, S. L., & Keating, C. F. (1988). Power displays between women and men in discussions of gender-linked tasks: A multichannel study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55(4), 580–587.
- Dozier, R. W. (1998). *Fear itself: The origin and nature of the powerful emotion that shapes our lives and our world*. New York, NY: St Martin's Press.
- Duntley, J. D. (2005). Adaptations to dangers from humans. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), *The handbook of evolutionary psychology* (pp. 224–249). Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
- Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., Lawrence, K. A., & Miner-Rubino, K. (2002). Red light, green light: Making sense of the organizational context for issue selling. *Organization Science*, 13(4), 355–369.
- Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O'Neill, R. M., Hayes, E., & Wierba, E. E. (1997). Reading the wind: How middle managers assess the context for selling issues to top managers. *Strategic Management Journal*, 18(5), 407–425.
- Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O'Neill, R. M., & Lawrence, K. A. (2001). Moves that matter: Issue selling and organizational change. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44(4), 716–736.
- Edmondson, A. C. (1996). Learning from mistakes is easier said than done: Group and organizational influences on the detection and correction of human error. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 32(1), 5–28.
- Edmondson, A. C. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44(2), 350–383.
- Edmondson, A. C. (2002). The local and variegated nature of learning in organizations: A group-level perspective. *Organization Science*, 13(2), 128–146.
- Edmondson, A. C. (2003). Speaking up in the operating room: How team leaders promote learning in interdisciplinary action teams. *Journal of Management Studies*, 40, 1419–1452.
- Edmondson, A. C., & Smith, D. M. (2006). Too hot to handle? How to manage relationship conflict. *California Management Review*, 49(1), 6–31.
- Edwards, M. S., Ashkanasy, N. M., & Gardner, J. (2009). Deciding to speak up or remain silent following observed wrongdoing: The role of discrete emotions and climate of silence. In M. S. Edwards & J. Greenberg (Eds.), *Voice and silence in organizations* (pp. 83–109). Bingley: Emerald Group.
- Edwards, M. S., & Greenberg, J. (2009). Sounding off on voice and silence. In M. S. Edwards & J. Greenberg (Eds.), *Voice and silence in organizations* (pp. 275–291). Bingley: Emerald Group.
- Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation, and moral development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 51, 665–697.
- Ekman, P. (1992). An argument for basic emotions. *Cognition & Emotion*, 6, 169–200.
- Erdal, D., & Whiten, A. (1994). On human egalitarianism: An evolutionary product of Machiavellian status escalation? *Current Anthropology*, 35(2), 175–178.
- Ermer, E., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2008). Relative status regulates risky decision making about resources in men: Evidence for the co-evolution of motivation and cognition. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 29, 106–118.
- Fenz, W. D., & Epstein, S. (1967). Gradients of physiological arousal in parachutists as a function of an approaching jump. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, XXIX(1), 33–51.
- Field, A. P., Argyris, N. G., & Knowles, K. A. (2001). Who's afraid of the big bad wolf: A prospective paradigm to test Rachman's indirect pathways in children. *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, 39, 1259–1276.
- Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. F. (1991). *Social cognition* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Fitness, J. (2000). Anger in the workplace: An emotion script approach to anger episodes between workers and their superiors, co-workers, and subordinates. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 21, 147–162.
- Forgas, J. P., & East, R. (2008). How real is that smile? Mood effects on accepting or rejecting the veracity of emotional facial expressions. *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior*, 32(3), 157–170.
- French, J. R. P., & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in social power*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research.
- Frijda, N. H. (1986). *The emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fu, P. P., Wu, R., Yang, Y., & Ye, J. (2007). Chinese culture and leadership. In J. S. Chhokar, F. C. Brodbeck, & R. J. House (Eds.), *Culture and leadership across the world: The GLOBE book of in-depth studies of 25 societies* (pp. 877–908). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Furedi, F. (2002). *Culture of fear*. New York: Continuum Publishing.
- Furedi, F. (2006). *Culture of fear revisited: Risk-taking and the morality of low expectations* (4th ed.). New York: Continuum.
- Geddes, D., & Callister, R. R. (2007). Crossing the line(s): A dual threshold model of anger in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 32(3), 721–746.
- Gioia, D. A., & Sims, H. P. (1986). Introduction: Social cognition in organizations. In H. P. Sims, Jr. & D. A. Gioia (Eds.), *The thinking organization: Dynamics of organizational social cognition* (pp. 1–19). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Glassner, B. (1999). *The culture of fear*. New York: Basic Books.
- Graham, J. W. (1986). Principled organizational dissent: A theoretical essay. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 8, 1–52.
- Grandey, A. A. (2008). Emotions at work: A review and research agenda. In Barling, J., & Cooper, C. L. Eds. *The SAGE handbook of organizational behavior: Vol. 1: Micro approaches* (Vol. 1). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. pp. 234–261.
- Gray, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (2000). *The neuropsychology of anxiety* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gross, J. J. (2008). Emotion regulation. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Gundlach, M. J., Douglas, S. C., & Martinko, M. J. (2003a). The decision to blow the whistle: A social information processing framework. *Academy of Management Journal*, 28(1), 107–123.

- Gundlach, M. J., Martinko, M. J., & Douglas, S. C. (2003b). Emotional intelligence, causal reasoning, and the self-efficacy development process. *International Journal of Organizational Analysis*, 11(3), 229–246.
- Hankiss, E. (2001). *Fears and symbols: An introduction to the study of Western Civilization*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Harlos, K. P., & Pinder, C. C. (2000). Emotion and injustice in the workplace. In S. Fineman (Ed.), *Emotion in organizations* (pp. 255–276). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Henik, E. G. (2008). *Mad as hell or scared stiff? The effects of value conflict and emotions on potential whistle-blowers*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California-Berkeley.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations and states*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1996). Filial piety and its psychological consequences. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), *Handbook of Chinese psychology* (pp. 155–165). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffman, M. L. (2008). Empathy and prosocial behavior. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
- Hofstede, G. (1984). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (2004). *Culture, leadership and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Izard, C. E. (1991). *The psychology of emotions*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Izard, C. E. (1993). Four systems for emotion activation: Cognitive and noncognitive processes. *Psychological Review*, 100(1), 68–90.
- Janes, L. M., & Olson, J. M. (2000). Jeer pressure: The behavioral effects of observing ridicule of others. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(4), 474–485.
- Johannesen, R. L. (1974). The function of silence: A plea for communication research. *Western Speech*, 38(1), 25–35.
- Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-contingent model. *Academy of Management Review*, 16(2), 366–395.
- Jones, B. F. (2007). Spanking away sin. *The Christian Century*, 124(9), 8–9.
- Judge, T. A., & Cable, D. M. (2004). The effect of physical height on workplace success and income: Preliminary test of a theoretical model. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(3), 428–441.
- Kellerman, B. (2008). *Followership: How followers are creating change and changing leaders*. Boston: Harvard Business Press.
- Kelman, H. C., & Hamilton, V. L. (1989). *Crimes of obedience*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Kenrick, D. T., Maner, J. K., & Li, N. P. (2005). Evolutionary social psychology. In D. M. Buss (Ed.), *Handbook of evolutionary psychology*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
- Kerr, N. L., & Levine, J. M. (2008). The detection of social exclusion: Evolution and beyond. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice*, 12(1), 39–52.
- Kirschbaum, C., & Hellhammer, D. H. (1994). Salivary cortisol in psychoneuroendocrine research: Recent developments and applications. *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, 19(4), 313–333.
- Knauff, B. (1994). Reply to Erdal and Whiten. *Current Anthropology*, 35(2), 181–182.
- Krakauer, J. (2003). *Under the banner of heaven: A story of violent faith*. New York: Double Day.
- Kramer, R. M. (1996). Divergent realities and convergent disappointments in the hierarchic relation: Trust and the intuitive auditor at work. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), *Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Kreitler, S. (2004). The dynamics of fear and anxiety. In P. L. Gower (Ed.), *Psychology of fear* (pp. 1–17). New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lazarus, R. S., & Averill, J. R. (1972). Emotion and cognition: With special reference to anxiety. In C. D. Spielberger (Ed.), *Anxiety: Current trends in theory and research*. New York: Academic Press.
- Leaf, M. (1946). *How to behave and why*. New York: Universe Publishing.
- LeDoux, J. E. (1996). *The emotional brain*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- LeDoux, J. E., & Phelps, E. A. (2008). Emotional networks in the brain. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
- LePine, J. A., & Van Dyne, L. (1998). Predicting voice behavior in work groups. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83(6), 853–868.
- LePine, J. A., & Van Dyne, L. (2001). Voice and cooperative behavior as contrasting forms of contextual performance: Evidence of differential relationships with big five personality characteristics and cognitive ability. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 86(2), 326–336.
- Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice. *Cognition and Emotion*, 14(4), 473–493.
- Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(1), 146–159.
- Lerner, J. S., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Portrait of the angry decision maker: How appraisal tendencies shape anger's influence on. *Cognition Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, 19, 115–137.
- Lewis, B. (1974). *Islam: From the Prophet Mohammad to the capture of Constantinople* (Vol. 1). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lindsey, R. (1986, January 12). The Mormons: Growth, prosperity and controversy. *The New York Times Magazine*, 19–46.
- Locke, C. C. (2008). *The downside of looking like a leader: Examining the effects of leadership demeanor on follower voice*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California-Berkeley.
- Lord, R. G., & Foti, R. J. (1986). Schema theories, information processing and organizational behavior. In H. P., Sims, Jr. & D. A. Gioia (Eds.), *The thinking organization: Dynamics of organizational social cognition*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Lyubomirsky, S., King, L., & Diener, E. (2005). The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does happiness lead to success? *Psychological Bulletin*, 131(6), 803–855.

- MacDonald, G., Kingsbury, R., & Shaw, S. (2005). Adding insult to injury: Social pain theory and response to social exclusion. In K. D. Williams, J. P. Forgas, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), *The social outcast: Ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and bullying* (pp. 77–90). New York: Taylor & Francis.
- MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R. (2005). Why does social exclusion hurt? The relationship between social and physical pain. *Psychological Bulletin*, *131*(2), 202–223.
- Maddux, J. E. (1995). *Self-efficacy, adaptation, and adjustment: Theory, research and application*. New York, NY: Plenum Press.
- Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *2*(1), 351–398.
- Maner, J. K., & Gerend, M. A. (2007). Motivationally selective risk judgments: Do fear and curiosity boost the boons or the banes? *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *103*, 256–267.
- Maner, J. K., Kenrick, D. T., Becker, V., Robertson, T. E., Hofer, B., Neuberg, S. L., et al. (2005). Functional projection: How fundamental social motives can bias interpersonal perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*(1), 63–78.
- Martin, J., & Powers, M. E. (1983). Truth or corporate propaganda: The value of a good war story. In L. R. Pondy, P. J. Frost, G. Morgan, & T. C. Dandridge (Eds.), *Organizational symbolism* (pp. 93–107). Greenwich: JAI Press, Inc.
- Matsumoto, D., Keltner, D., Shiota, M., O'Sullivan, N., & Frank, M. M. (2008). Facial expressions of emotion. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
- McBrien, R. P. (Ed.). (1995). *The HarperCollins encyclopedia of Catholicism*. San Francisco: HarperCollins.
- McCullough, M. E., Orsulak, P., Brandon, A., & Akers, L. (2007). Rumination, fear, and cortisol: An in vivo study of interpersonal transgressions. *Health Psychology*, *26*(1), 126–132.
- Mesmer-Magnus, J. R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in organizations: An examination of correlates of whistleblowing intentions, actions, and retaliation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *62*, 277–297.
- Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., & Dworkin, T. M. (2008). *Whistle-blowing in organizations*. New York: Routledge.
- Mikel, A. E., & Ozcelik, H. (2008). When executives get angry: The importance of anger and its triggers to ethical awareness and sensitivity. *Emotions, Ethics and Decision-Making*, *4*, 131–154.
- Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to authority*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Milliken, F. J., & Morrison, E. W. (2003). Shades of silence: Emerging themes and future directions for research on silence in organizations. *Journal of Management Studies*, *40*(6), 1563–1568.
- Milliken, F. J., Morrison, E. W., & Hewlin, P. F. (2003). An exploratory study of employee silence: Issues that employees don't communicate upward and why. *Journal of Management Studies*, *40*(6), 1453–1473.
- Mineka, S., & Sutton, J. (2006). Contemporary learning theory perspectives on the etiology of fears and phobias. In M. G. Craske, D. Hermans, & D. Vansteenwegen (Eds.), *Fear and learning: From basic processes to clinical implications*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Mitchell, M. S., & Palmer, N. F. (2007). *Understanding the influence of ethical efficacy*. Presented at the 2008 Academy of Management Meeting, Anaheim.
- Morrison, E. W., & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence: A barrier to change and development in a pluralistic world. *Academy of Management Review*, *25*(4), 706–725.
- Morrison, E. W., & Phelps, C. C. (1999). Taking charge at work: Extrarole efforts to initiate workplace change. *Academy of Management Journal*, *42*(4), 403–419.
- Morrison, E. W., & Rothman, N. B. (2009). Silence and the dynamics of power. In M. S. Edwards & J. Greenberg (Eds.), *Voice and silence in organizations* (pp. 111–133). Bingley: Emerald Group.
- Muris, P. (2007). *Normal and abnormal fear and anxiety in children and adolescents*. Burlington: Elsevier.
- Muris, P., Bogels, S., Meesters, C., der Kamp, N., & van Oosten, A. (1996). Parental rearing practices, fearfulness, and problem behavior in clinically referred children. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *21*, 813–818.
- Myers, K. M., Ressler, K. J., & Davis, M. (2006). Different mechanisms of fear extinction dependent on length of time since fear acquisition. *Learning & Memory*, *13*, 216–223.
- Nembhard, I. M., & Edmondson, A. C. (2006). Making it safe: The effects of leader inclusiveness and professional status on psychological safety and improvement efforts in health care teams. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *27*, 941–966.
- Neuberg, S. L., & Cottrell, C. A. (2006). Evolutionary bases of prejudices. In M. Schaller, J. A. Simpson, & D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), *Evolution and social psychology* (pp. 163–187). New York: Psychology Press.
- Ohman, A. (1993). Fear and anxiety as emotional phenomena: Clinical phenomenology, evolutionary perspectives and information-processing mechanisms. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (1st ed., pp. 511–536). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Ohman, A. (2000). Fear and anxiety: Evolutionary, cognitive and clinical perspectives. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (2nd ed., pp. 573–593). New York: Guilford Press.
- Ohman, A. (2008). Fear and anxiety: Overlaps and dissociations. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
- Ohman, A., Dimberg, U., & Ost, L.-G. (1985). Animal and social phobias: Biological constraints on learned fear responses. In S. Reiss & R. R. Bootzin (Eds.), *Theoretical issues in behavior therapy*. New York: Academic Press.
- Ohman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fear, phobias, and preparedness: Toward an evolved module of fear and fear learning. *Psychological Review*, *108*(3), 483–522.
- Ohman, A., & Wiens, S. (2001). The concept of an evolved fear module and cognitive theories of anxiety. In A. S. R. Manstead, N. Frijda, & A. Fischer (Eds.), *Feelings and emotions: The Amsterdam symposium* (pp. 58–80). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ohman, A., & Wiens, S. (2003). On the automaticity of autonomic responses in emotion: An evolutionary perspective. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), *Handbook of affective sciences* (pp. 256–275). New York: Oxford University Press.

- Olsson, A., & Phelps, E. A. (2007). Social learning of fear. *Nature Neuroscience*, *10*(9), 1095–1102.
- O'Reilly, C. A., & Chatman, J. A. (1996). Culture as social control: corporations, cults and commitment. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *18*, 157–200.
- Overmier, J. B., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1967). Effects of inescapable shock upon subsequent escape and avoidance learning. *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, *63*, 23–33.
- Parker, S. K., Bindl, U. K., Van Dyne, L., & Wong, S. F. (2009). *Measuring motives for silence*. Paper to be presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL.
- Pearl, M., & Pearl, D. (1994). *To train up a child*. Pleasantville: No Greater Joy Ministries.
- Piderit, S. K., & Ashford, S. J. (2003). Breaking silence: Tactical choices women managers make in speaking up about gender-equity issues. *Journal of Management Studies*, *40*(6).
- Pinder, C. C., & Harlos, K. P. (2001). Employee silence: Quiescence and acquiescence as responses to perceived injustice. In Rowland, K. M., & Ferris, G. R. Eds. *Research in personnel and human resources management*. Vol. 20 (pp.331–369). New York, NY: JAI Press.
- Pinker, S. (1997). *How the mind works*. New York: WW Norton & Company.
- Plutchik, R. (2003). *Emotions and life: Perspectives from psychology, biology and evolution*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Power, M., & Dalgleish, T. (2008). *Cognition and emotion*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Premaux, S. F., & Bedeian, A. G. (2003). Breaking the silence: The moderating effects of self-monitoring in predicting speaking in the workplace. *Journal of Management Studies*, *40*(6), 1537–1562.
- Rachman, S. (1990). *Fear and courage*. Gordonsville: WH Freeman & Company.
- Rachman, S. (2004). *Anxiety* (2nd ed.). New York: Psychology Press.
- Ragins, B. R., Singh, R., & Cornwell, J. M. (2007). Making the invisible visible: Fear and disclosure of sexual orientation at work. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(4), 1103–1118.
- Reiss, S. (1980). Pavlovian conditioning and human fear: An expectancy model. *Journal of Behavior Therapy*, *11*, 380–396.
- Reiter, E. (1996). *Making fast food: From the frying pan into the fryer*. McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Roberts, J. V., & Herman, C. P. (1986). The psychology of height: An empirical review. In C. P. Herman, M. P. Zanna, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Physical appearance, stigma, and social behavior*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Roseman, I. J., & Smith, C. A. (2001). Appraisal theory: Overview, assumptions, varieties, controversies. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rosen, J. B., & Schulkin, J. (1998). From normal fear to pathological anxiety. *Psychological Review*, *105*(2), 325–350.
- Rudman, L. A., & Kilianski, S. E. (2000). Implicit and explicit attitudes toward female authority. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *26*(11), 1315–1328.
- Rusbult, C. E., Farrell, D., Rogers, G., & Mainous, A. G., III (1988). Impact of exchange variables on exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect: An integrative model of responses to declining job satisfaction. *Academy of Management Journal*, *31*(3), 599–627.
- Ryan, K. D., & Oestreich, D. K. (1991). *Driving fear out of the workplace: How to overcome the invisible barriers to quality, productivity and innovation*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Salovey, P., Detweiler-Bedell, B. T., Detweiler-Bedell, J. B., & Mayer, J. D. (2008). Emotional intelligence. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
- Salska, I., Frederick, D. A., Pawlowski, B., Reilly, A. H., Laird, K. T., & Rudd, N. A. (2008). Conditional mate preference: Factors influencing preferences for height. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *44*, 203–215.
- Sapolsky, R. M. (2005). The influence of social hierarchy on primate health. *Science*, *308*(5722), 648–652.
- Saul, H. (2002). *Phobias: Fighting the fear*. New York, NY: Arcade Publishing.
- Saunders, D. M., Sheppard, B. H., Knight, V., & Roth, J. (1992). Employee voice to supervisors. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, *5*(3), 241–259.
- Scherer, K. R. (1986). Voice affect expression: A review and a model for future research. *Psychological Bulletin*, *99*, 143–165.
- Scherer, K. R. (2000). Emotion. In M. Hewstone & W. Stroebe (Eds.), *Introduction to social psychology: A European perspective* (3rd ed., pp. 151–191). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Scruton, D. L. (1986). Introduction. In D. L. Scruton (Ed.), *Sociophobics: The anthropology of fear*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Seibert, S. E., Kraimer, M. L., & Crant, M. (2001). What do proactive people do? A longitudinal model linking proactive personality and career success. *Personnel Psychology*, *54*(4), 845–874.
- Seligman, M. E. P. (1971). Phobias and preparedness. *Behavior Therapy*, *2*, 307–320.
- Seligman, M. E. P. (1975). *Helplessness: On depression development and death*. San Francisco: WH Freeman and Company.
- Sennett, R. (1980). *Authority*. New York: Alfred A Knopf Publishing.
- Shlapentokh, V. (2006). *Fear in contemporary society: Its negative and positive effects*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smith, C. A., & Kirby, L. D. (2001). Toward delivering on the promise of appraisal theory. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods and research* (pp. 121–138). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sonenshein, S. (2006). Crafting social issues at work. *Academy of Management Journal*, *49*(6), 1158–1172.
- Sprague, J., & Ruud, G. L. (1988). Boat-rocking in the high-technology culture. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *32*(2), 169–193.
- Staw, B. M., & Boettger, R. D. (1990). Task revision: A neglected form of work performance. *Academy of Management Journal*, *33*(3), 534–559.
- Stearns, P. N., & Haggerty, T. (1991). The role of fear: Transitions in American emotional standards for children, 1850–1950. *The American Historical Review*, *96*(1), 63.
- Stets, J. E., & Turner, J. H. (2008). Introduction. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 1–10). New York: Springer.

- Sundie, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Griskevicius, V., & Kenrick, D. T. (2006). Evolutionary social influence. In M. Schaller, J. A. Simpson, & D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), *Evolution and social psychology* (pp. 287–316). New York: Psychology Press.
- Tangirala, S., & Ramanujam, R. (2008). Employee silence on critical work issues: The cross level effects of procedural justice climate. *Personnel Psychology*, 61(1), 37–68.
- TenHouton, W. D. (2007). *A general theory of emotions and social life*. New York: Routledge.
- Tepper, B. J. (2000). Consequences of abusive supervision. *Academy of Management Journal*, 3, 178–190.
- Tiedens, L. Z. (2000). Powerful emotions: The vicious cycle of social status positions and emotions. In N. M. Ashkanasy, C. E. J. Hartel, & W. J. Zerbe (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Research, theory, and practice*. Westport, CT: Quorum Books.
- Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80(1), 86–94.
- Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1995). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), *The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., Gibson, D. G., & Toffler, B. L. (1999). Managing ethics and legal compliance: What works and what hurts. *California Management Review*, 41(2), 131–151.
- Treviño, L. K., & Victor, B. (1992). Peer reporting of unethical behavior: A social context perspective. *Academy of Management Journal*, 35(1), 38–64.
- Treviño, L. K., & Youngblood, S. A. (1990). Bad apples in bad barrels: A causal analysis of ethical decision-making behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 75(4), 378–385.
- Trower, G., & Gilbert, G. (1989). New theoretical conceptions of social anxiety and social phobia. *Clinical Psychology Review*, 9, 19–35.
- Turner, J. H. (2000). *On the origins of human emotions: A sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Van Dyne, L., Ang, S., & Botero, I. C. (2003). Conceptualizing employee silence and employee voice as multidimensional constructs. *Journal of Management Studies*, 40(6), 1359–1392.
- Van Dyne, L., Cummings, L. L., & McLean Parks, J. (1995). Extra-role behaviors: in pursuit of construct and definitional clarity (a bridge over muddied waters). *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 17, 215–285.
- Van Dyne, L., & LePine, J. A. (1998). Helping and voice extra-role behaviors: Evidence of construct and predictive validity. *Academy of Management Journal*, 47(1), 108–119.
- Van Kleef, G. A., & Cote, S. (2007). Expressing anger in conflict: When it helps and when it hurts. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92, 1557–1569.
- Van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B. (2008). Leadership, followership, and evolution. *American Psychologist*, 63(3), 182–196.
- Walsh, J. P. (1995). Managerial and organizational cognition: Notes from a trip down memory lane. *Organization Science*, 6(3), 280–321.
- Walton, S. (2004). *Humanity: An emotional history*. Atlantic Books.
- Weber, M. (1947). *Max Weber: The theory of social and economic organization*. New York: The Free Press.
- Weick, K. E., & Roberts, K. H. (1993). Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on flight decks. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 38(3), 357–381.
- Weiss, H. M., & Cropanzano, R. (1996). Affective events theory: A theoretical discussion of the structure, causes, and consequences of affective experiences at work. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 18, 1–74.
- Williams, K. D. (2001). *Ostracism: The power of silence*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Withey, M. J., & Cooper, W. H. (1989). Predicting exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 34, 521–539.
- Wolfson, A. (2005). A hoax most cruel. *Courier-Journal Newspaper*.
- Wood, R., & Bandura, A. (1989). Social cognitive theory of organizational management. *Academy of Management Review*, 14(3), 361–384.
- Wu, D. Y. H. (1996). Chinese childhood socialization. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), *Handbook of Chinese psychology* (pp. 143–154). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Young, T. J., & French, L. A. (1996). Height and perceived competence of US Presidents. *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, 82.